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Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?
Cass R. Sunstein*
The American people are suffering from what can be called “a syndrome
of paranoia and neglect” about potential dangers to their health, safety,
and the environment. This leads to a paradox that is becoming
increasingly recognized. Large amounts of resources are devoted to slight
or speculative dangers while substantial and well-documented dangers
remain unaddressed.
John Graham1
The last third of the twentieth century is not too late a time for turning
the rule of law and the non-delegation doctrine into effective and useful
legal tools for minimizing injustice from improper discretionary power.
Kenneth Culp Davis2

I. Introduction:
Environmental Policy and Administrative Law
In issuing and revising a national ambient air quality regulation
under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) should provide a detailed “benefits analysis.” To this end, it
should undertake two tasks. First, it should specify the range of
benefits that it believes will result from the regulation, along with a
specification of the range of benefits that it believes would result
from at least two reasonable alternative approaches, one stricter and
*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of
Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science. I am grateful to
Elizabeth Garrett, John Graham, Robert Hahn, Lisa Heinzerling, Jeffrey Knight,
Eric Posner, William Pederson, Richard Posner, David Strauss, and participants
in a work in progress lunch at the University of Chicago Law School for valuable
comments on a previous draft. I am also grateful to Hahn for organizing a panel
discussion of the joint Brookings-American Enterprise Institute Center on Federal
Regulation, where I learned a great deal from the comments of my co-panelists,
Boyden Gray, Carol Browner, and Edward Warren. Brooke May provided superb
research assistance. Thanks also to Robert Gasaway and attorneys at the
Environmental Protection Agency for providing valuable information.
1
John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Risks,
Benefits, and Lives Saved 183, 183 (Robert Hahn ed. 1996).
2
Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice 51 (1969).
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one more lenient. In the process EPA should identify the residual
risk left under the competing regulatory regimes; it should also
acknowledge scientific uncertainty, to the extent that uncertainty
exists and requires guesswork. This proposal is an effort to
strengthen the role of sound science in environmental protection.
Second, the EPA should explain why it believes that the chosen rule
is preferable to the less and more stringent alternatives—why the set
of benefits to be received from the selected rule justifies that rule,
whereas the set of benefits to be received from the less and more
stringent rule does not. In the process it should explain why the
residual risk left by the selected rule is acceptable, while the residual
risk left by the less stringent rule is not. This proposal is an effort to
strengthen the role of democratic forces in environmental
protection.3
If necessary, reviewing courts should require the EPA to
perform these tasks. Taken together, the two proposals should
increase the level of consistency across regulations, reducing the
power of well-organized private groups, and also diminishing the
risks associated with both insufficient and excessive environmental
regulation. If the EPA has undertaken the two tasks, and carried
them out in a reasonable way, judicial review is at an end; courts
should uphold the EPA’s decision.
Ideas of this kind have potentially broad implications, extending
well beyond the Clean Air Act and even the EPA, to the work of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, and the National Highway Traffic and
Safety Administration as well. They would mark a key moment in
the movement toward a system of environmental protection that is at
once more democratic and better informed. At the same time, they
would accelerate the continuing shift from 1970s environmentalism
and indeed 1970s regulation in general, away from recognizing the
existence of problems of safety and health and toward assessing their
magnitude, in such a way as to reduce both regulatory paranoia and

3
Of course costs are important too; the two proposals are based on the current
understanding that benefits, but not costs, may be taken into account in issuing
primary standards. The question of costs is taken up later, see below.
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regulatory neglect, and to put a premium on the acquisition of
information.4
If agencies undertook tasks of this kind, there would be little
point to the recent resurgence of interest in the nondelegation
doctrine. The sensible impulses that underlie those
innovations—impulses that involve accountability, deliberation, and
sound policymaking—can be taken care of through other means, a
point that casts a more general light on the proper role of the
nondelegation doctrine in American public law. Taken together,
judicial requirements of this kind would constitute a form of
“democracy-promoting minimalism”5 in the distinctive context of
administrative law. These are the basic claims that I will attempt to
defend in this Article.
A. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act may well be the most important of all
environmental statutes. Its effects include a wide range of beneficial
consequences for human health and well-being and extremely high
costs on the private sector. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) estimates overall compliance costs at $0.5 trillion.6 The Act’s
claim to success rests on enormous improvements in ambient air
quality and corresponding health benefits. The EPA estimates that
the Act prevents at least 45,000 deaths annually and that it also
prevents a minimum of 13,000 heart attacks and 7000 annual
strokes.7 On a standard (though not undisputed) view, the benefits
4

For general discussion in this vein, see Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious
Circle (1993).
5
See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court (1999), on the general topic of judicial minimalism.
6
J. Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek, Pollution Control in the United States 130
(1998).
7
Id. Judgments about benefits, nonmonetized but especially monetized, are highly
sensitive to contentious assumptions, and hence the “bottom line” numbers should
be taken with many grains of salt. See Randall Lutter, An Analysis of the Use of
EPA’s Benefit Estimates in OMB’s Draft Report on the Costs and Benefits of
Regulation (October 1998), urging the use of plausible alternative assumptions
and that EPA’s benefit calculations are inflated. See also Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale LJ 1981 (1998) (urging that
cost per lives saved are inflated, also because of contentious assumptions). Though
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of the Act, ranging between $5.6 trillion and $49.4 trillion, far
exceed its costs.8
The Act has nonetheless been subject to telling criticism. The
foundation of clear air regulation consists in the EPA’s issuance of
nationally uniform ambient air quality standards9; but in light of the
extraordinary diversity of the fifty states, it is not clear that the idea
of national standards can be rationally defended.10 Both lower courts
and the EPA seem to think that the standard-setting process does
not and cannot involve consideration of costs.11 But does it make
sense, or is it even feasible, to say that national standards will be
founded on an assessment of benefits alone, conducted in a costvacuum?12 If an improvement in ambient air quality would produce
health benefits that are small but not trivial, isn’t it clear that the
improvement is justified if compliance costs are trivial, but perhaps
not if the costs are very high? There is reason to think that at least in
some cases, an understanding of costs has affected the EPA’s
decision about appropriate standards—but that the cost-benefit
balancing has been left implicit and free from public scrutiny and
review.13
coming from different directions, Lutter and Heinzerling both argue,
convincingly, that characterization of both benefits and costs can shift dramatically
with small changes in assumptions, an argument that much bears on the central
claims of this Article. See below.
8
See J. Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek, Pollution Control in the United States
130, 147 (1998).
9
42 USC 7409(a).
10
See James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and
Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 323 (1974). For an instructive recent
discussion of how the “slippage” between law on the books and law in the world
actually allows a degree of flexibility, and converts seemingly rigid standards into a
basis for negotiation and pragmatism, see Daniel Farber, Taking Slippage
Seriously, 23 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 297 (1999).
11
See Lead Industries v. EPA, 449 U.S. 1042 (DDC 1980); American Trucking
v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir. 1999).
12
See Marc K. Landy. Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen J. Thomas, The
Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to
Clinton 49-82, 279-83 (1994).
13
See id; see also Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11
Tul. Envtl. L.J. 235 (1998).
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Perhaps the largest question involves the criteria by which EPA
decides whether one or another level of regulation is (in the statutory
phrase) “requisite to protect the public health.”14 For most
pollutants, air quality at various levels is not either “safe” or “not
safe”; there are diminishing degrees of risk associated with
diminishing degrees of exposure. On what basis is a particular level
of residual risk said to be the appropriate one? What judgments do,
or should, enter into that conclusion? The EPA has been criticized
for sometimes suggesting, in an unhelpful and conclusory fashion,
that it chooses the “safe” level, as if this were solely a technocratic
judgment and as if “safety” were an on-off switch,15 when its decision
about permissible levels rests instead on a series of political,
scientific, and economic judgments and compromises.
There are two problems with this state of affairs. The first
involves democratic deliberation.16 If the EPA does not give a clear
sense of the range of adverse effects, and if it does not say why one
set of such effects calls for regulation and another does not, the
public and their representatives are not informed of the nature of the
underlying questions, and they are unable to evaluate the choices
actually made. Under the EPA’s articulated position, a purely
technical issue (would a certain level be safe?) is sometimes
substituted, at least publicly, for the real and more complicated ones
(what level of safety is appropriate in light of all the relevant factors?
why should one level of regulation be preferred to another?).
The second problem involves sound regulatory policy. Any
proposed national standard could be loosened or tightened, and the
question is whether the agency has chosen the optimal, or at least a
reasonable, regulatory “point.” Without a clear and (to the extent
possible) quantified presentation of the expected environmental
benefits of the various alternatives,17 there can be no assurance that
14

42 USC 7409.
See Landy et al., supra note, at 379-83. The criticism is not sound as applied to
the particulates and ozone regulations, but here too, the EPA’s explanation leaves
many open questions.
16
See id.
17
Costs are of course important too. As discussed below, the prevailing view
forbids EPA from considering costs, and my basic proposal does not challenge
that prevailing view. I do, however, raise some doubts about it below.
15
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the agency has chosen that point, rather than one that is too strict or
too lenient.
B. A Remarkable Decision and a New Doctrine
In its extraordinary decision in American Trucking Association v.
EPA,18 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit responded to this last concern in the strongest
possible terms. It held that as interpreted by the EPA, the key
provisions of the Clean Air Act—those that give the EPA authority
to issue national air quality standards—represent an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.19 The decision announces the birth of
a new nondelegation doctrine, one with potentially large
implications for regulatory policy. Under the new doctrine, openended statutory terms will be invalidated unless agencies are able to
specify the governing legal criteria—to discipline their own authority
through narrowing interpretations.
The new nondelegation doctrine is remarkable for many
reasons. First, the Supreme Court has not used the doctrine to
invalidate a federal statute since (or for that matter before) 1935,20
and hence any such decision by a court of appeals is reasonably taken
to mark a fresh departure. Second, the new doctrine does not require
Congress to legislate with clarity. It says instead that if Congress has
not been clear, agencies must act on their own, to set out limits on
their own legal authority. Third, there now appears to be a genuine
doctrine in place; American Trucking represents no isolated decision,
but the culmination of a line of lower court cases, one of which was a
similar decision about the Occupational Safety and Health Act.21
The decision therefore signals a distinctive approach to judicial
review of agency action. Fourth, the doctrine is conspicuously
responsive to what the court of appeals saw (and often sees22) as a
general problem in federal regulation: the difficulty of knowing why
18

175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999).
Id. at 1030-1034.
20
See Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
21
See Industrial Union v. OSHA, 37 F.2d 605 (DC Cir. 1994).
22
See below.
19
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an agency chooses one level of regulation rather than another that is
somewhat higher or somewhat lower.
The new doctrine raises a number of questions. The narrowest
(though far from unimportant) issue has to do with the fate of EPA
rulemaking with respect to national ambient air quality standards.
What, if anything, can the EPA do in the future? The question is
significant both because of its consequences for implementation of
the Clean Air Act and because of its implications for regulatory
policy in general. On its face, the American Trucking decision would
seem to draw into serious constitutional question not only the EPA’s
ozone and particulates regulations, but also a wide range of other
regulations by the EPA, and indeed a wide range of decisions by
many other agencies involved in the protection of health and welfare
(and other areas as well; consider the Federal Communications
Commission). And what, exactly, is the relationship between the
new doctrine and ordinary judicial review to test whether agency
action has been “arbitrary” or “capricious”? An especially large
question, and the central focus here, has to do with how American
Trucking exposes continuing problems with the design and
implementation of environmental regulation as a whole and the
Clean Air Act in particular, a statute whose key provisions seem to
depend on implausible assumptions, and under which EPA has
sometimes hidden crucial questions of value with uninformative
platitudes.
C. Goals and Plans
In this Article my most general goal is to understand current
difficulties with environmental policy, the Clean Air Act, and EPA
promulgation of ambient air quality standards, and to see how courts
might perform a constructive role in making things better rather
than worse. My simplest claim is that the EPA should undertake the
two tasks identified above; it should specify the range of benefits that
it believes will follow from the regulation it seeks to impose,
including a discussion of the benefits from more lenient and more
stringent alternatives and a treatment of the residual risks under the
various regulatory regimes. It should also explain why it believes that
the chosen regulation is preferable to the alternatives.
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Steps in these directions would satisfy the legitimate concerns of
most critics of the EPA’s performance under the Clean Air Act and
also of the court of appeals in American Trucking. Such steps also
have broad applicability and would represent a new departure of
their own in administrative law, covering the activities of the EPA
under a wide range of statutes and also the activities of (for example)
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the
Consumer Product Safety Commision, and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration. Steps of this sort would not amount
to a nondelegation doctrine, new or old. But they are designed to
promote both rule of law values and sound regulatory policy, in a
way that should respond to growing understandings about current
problems in environmental policy and the administrative state.
I have three more particular goals. The first is to evaluate the
nondelegation doctrine, both old and new, as a way of ensuring
better and more transparent policy analysis by EPA and other
agencies. That issue raises large questions about democratic
accountability and about the appropriate role of courts in reviewing
agency action. I suggest that although the new doctrine has
considerable appeal, this is not really a nondelegation doctrine at all,
and the relevant goals would be better accomplished through a form
of more conventional (but better informed) judicial review of agency
action. The Clean Air Act is hardly unconstitutional, for it is
possible to generate an interpretation of the Act that imposes both
“floors” and “ceilings” on agency action.
My second goal is to propose a contemporary role for the
nondelegation doctrine in American public law. I claim that the
doctrine is properly held in reserve for extreme cases—that it serves
as a genuine, but judicially underenforced, constitutional norm—and
that it operates as a legitimate tool of statutory construction. More
importantly, I contend that the doctrine is not so much dead as
relocated. Its current home can be found not in cases invalidating
open-ended grants of authority, but in the many decisions using
various “clear statement” principles to discipline legislative and
administrative action.23 When courts require Congress to speak
23
See William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992), for a
catalogue.
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clearly in order to authorize an agency to raise a serious
constitutional problem, or to apply a statute extraterritorially or
retroactively, they are applying a narrower and more targeted version
of the nondelegation doctrine—a version that requires Congress to
focus, with particularity, on certain especially sensitive questions. By
requiring congressional rather than merely executive deliberation on
those questions, the various “clear statement” principles operate as a
nondelegation doctrine in another guise. As such, the principles are
easily defended, for they promote the key functions of the
nondelegation doctrine without carrying the risks of the old and new
versions.
My third goal is to discuss possible improvements in the
operation of the Clean Air Act, at the legislative, administrative, and
judicial levels, improvements that might respond to various concerns
about EPA performance, including the concerns expressed in
American Trucking. I attempt to explain how the Act seems based on
the (false) assumption that pollutants generally have “safe
thresholds,” and how this assumption has seriously impaired both
regulatory policymaking and democratic deliberation. I also suggest
that the Act should be interpreted, or if necessary amended, to allow
and require EPA to engage in “health-health tradeoffs” and to take
account of costs in setting national standards. In particular, I
emphasize that EPA should engage in more specific and quantitative
assessments of the hazardous effects of pollution at various levels, so
as to increase the transparency of its decisions. It would even make
sense for EPA to move in the direction of the “quality-adjusted life
years” approach designed to provide a concrete sense of the benefits
of regulatory alternatives. Under such an approach, EPA would
attempt to specify the range of “quality-adjusted life years” likely to
be saved by a regulation, and it would also indicate the degree of
savings that would justify a regulation. But because of the harmful
side-effects of aggressive judicial review, courts should play only a
secondary and catalytic role—embodied in certain recent and quite
innovative procedural developments in administrative law, above all
the “remand without invalidation.” As we will see, this procedural
route is administrative law’s newest species of minimalism, indeed a
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form of democracy-promoting minimalism.24 The central point is
that EPA should undertake such inquiries on its own.
This Article comes in six parts. Part II deals with the Clean Air
Act and in particular with the artificiality of the inquiries that it
appears to make central to EPA’s task. Part III explores the old
nondelegation doctrine, the development of the new nondelegation
doctrine, and the use of the doctrine in American Trucking and
related cases. Part IV evaluates the new doctrine, explains why the
Clean Air Act is constitutionally unproblematic, and suggests an
alternative approach. Part V discusses the proper approaches to the
Act from Congress, the EPA, and reviewing courts. Part VI is a
brief conclusion.
II. The Clean Air Act
Taken as a whole, the benefits of the Clean Air Act seem clearly to
outweigh the costs.
J. Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek25
Congress should not preclude decisionmakers from considering the
economic benefits and costs of different policies in the development of
regulations.
Kenneth Arrow et al.26
Most environmental initiatives of the past seemed expensive and
questionable at the time, and today every one of them appears a bargain
in retrospect. Looking back on the present a few decades hence, society
will consider every environmental program running now to have been a
bargain, and wish more programs had been started sooner.
Gregg Easterbrook27

A. Setting National Standards
1. The key provisions
24

For a general discussion of judicial minimalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case
at a Time (1999).
25
J. Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek, Regulating Pollution: Does the US System
Work? 51 (1997).
26
Kenneth Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and
Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles (1996).
27
Greg Easterbrook, A Moment on the Earth 210 (1995).
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The Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970. Though many
hundreds of pages in length, some of them mind-numbingly specific
and detailed,28 the Act offers two remarkably brief provisions
designed to set the statutory program in motion.
The first of these provisions, and the central focus here, involves
primary national ambient air quality standards.29 Here the EPA is
asked to set standards “the attainment and maintenance of which in
the judgment of the Administrator,” based on air quality criteria
documents “and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite
to protect the public health.”30 The second of these provisions
involves secondary national ambient air quality standards, which the
EPA must set at levels “requisite to protect the public welfare from
any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence
of such air pollutant in the ambient air.”31 “Welfare” is defined to
include “effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade
materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage
to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as
well as effects on economic values an on personal comfort and wellbeing.”32 For secondary standards, involving welfare rather than
health, there is no provision for an “adequate margin of safety.” But
the secondaru standards are anticipated to be more stringent than
the primary ones; notice in particular the statutory emphasis on plant
and animal lfe.
These provisions have three especially noteworthy features.
First, they seem at first glance not to contemplate any consideration
of cost in the standard-setting process.33 Primary standards are based
28

Consider the acid deposition program, which goes so far as to list, by name,
every plant entitled to emit sulfur dioxide, 42 USC 7651c, and its permitted
emissions level (a flavor: 13,570 tons for Colvert generator 1 in Alabama, 15,430
tons for the Armstrong plant, generator number 2, in Pennsylvania)—alongside an
exceptionally specific program for the granting and trading of emissions rights.
29
42 USC 7409 (b).
30
42 USC 7409(b)(1)
31
42 USC 7409(b)(2).
32
42 USC 7602(h).
33
American Trucking Association confirms this reading. See 175 F.3d at 1030.
For the initial holding to this effect, see Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647
F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980).
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on health, apparently to be assessed in a cost vacuum, while
secondary standards are based on welfare, also apparently to be
assessed without regard to cost. This is not at all an inevitable
reading of the relevant provisions; perhaps the level “requisite to
protect the public health” and “welfare” is a function of cost, not only
benefit; but the prevailing interpretation is otherwise. 34 Second, the
standards are fully national—even though political judgments about
air quality vary greatly from state to state, and even though the
effects of improved air quality (on the cost and benefits sides) are
highly variable from one state to another. Finally, both provisions
appear to contemplate the existence of “safe thresholds.” The basic
idea is that the EPA should ensure that air is “safe” and that public
welfare is “protected.” What makes this idea distinctive is its
artificiality. To be sure, we could imagine pollutants for which the
evidence indicated a point of “no risk” or “de minimis risk.” At least
in theory, it is possible to construct a dose-response curve for which
risks effectively vanish at a certain defined point. But for most
pollutants, there are diminishing degrees of risk, associated with
diminishing degrees of pollution.35 “Safety” is not an off-on switch;
it is a matter of degree. When it is said that a certain level of
pollution is “safe,” what is really meant is that the residual risk is
acceptable or tolerable—not that there is no risk at all. Consider, for
example, this commendably direct testimony from the Chair of
EPA’s Scientific Advisory Committee’s panel on ozone and
particulates, unambiguously confessing the impossible nature of the
task imposed on the EPA by the Act:
“Based on information now available, it appears that ozone may
elicit a continuum of biological responses down to background
concentrations. It is critical to understand that a biological response
does not necessarily imply an adverse health effect. Nevertheless, this
means that the paradigm of selecting a standard at the lowestobservable-effects-level and the providing an ‘adequate margin of

34
35

Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980).
See, e.g., Landy et al., supra note, at 49-82.
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safety’ is not possible. It further means that risk assessments must
play a central role in identifying an appropriate level.”36
How might we explain the enactment of provisions that seem at
once so vague, rigid, and artificial? Much of the answer lies in the
distinctive political dynamic of environmental debates in the late
1960s and early 1970s, in which citizens wanted air to be “safe” and
politicians who failed to respond were at great risk.37 We might even
describe the result as “1970s environmentalism,” a form of thinking
that accomplished a great deal of good, by producing rapid decreases
in pollution levels, but that also seems increasingly anachronistic,
even counterproductive. In the 1970s in particular, politicians would
proceed at their peril if they asserted that “safety” could be
compromised by other goals.38 At the same time, politicians were
affected by, and doubtless catered to, the pervasive psychological
urge for certainty, as confirmed by evidence that people are willing to
pay a great deal for “no risk” and much less for “substantially less
risk.”39 Thus, for example, people are willing to pay more for a
reduction of a risk from 0.1 to 0.0 than from 0.3 to 0.1.40 The idea
that the Clean Air Act would produce “safety” rather than “reduced
risk” made it far easier to support, and far harder to challenge.
Undoubtedly Congress believed that it was delegating to EPA
the power to be reasonable rather than unreasonable, and in any case
the Act allowed various safeguards in the event that compliance
proved to be excessively costly.41 As we will see, the most important
safeguard consisted in a form of (implicitly authorized) civil
disobedience on the part of all relevant actors, including the EPA,
36

Prepared Testimony of George T. Woolf, Chair, EPA’s Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee’s Panel on Ozone and PM, Before the House Judiciary
Committee, July 29, 1997.
37
See Bruce Ackerman, John Millian, and Donald Elliott, Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. Econ. &
Organization 313 (1985).
38
See id.
39
See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); George Loewenstein et al.,
Risk As Feelings (unpublished manuscript 1999).
40
See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra.
41
For an outline, see Union Electric v. EPA, 427 US 246 (1977).
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which was simply not prepared to shut down automobile traffic in
Los Angeles, a step that would have been necessary to produce
compliance with national air quality standards.42
2. Problems and puzzles
All of these points have created serious difficulties for the EPA
in practice. For nonthreshold pollutants, it seems both natural and
sensible to assess further reductions in terms of their cost. If, for
example, the expense of reducing sulfur dioxide from .3 ppm to .2
ppm is trivial, then the reduction is almost certainly worthwhile
(unless the dose-response curve has a most peculiar shape43). Even if
there is little direct evidence of adverse human health effects at .2
ppm, this is likely to be because of the limited data, rather than
because of an absence of such effects. But matters look very different
if the cost would run into the tens of billions of dollars. When
benefits are highly uncertain, it is peculiar to say that EPA cannot
consider cost, especially since health gains are almost inevitable as
permissible exposure levels decline.44
In light of this point, some critics have suggested that some
kind of cost-benefit balancing inevitably occurs at EPA.45 At least
publicly, EPA denies this claim.46 Consider Administrator Browner’s
suggestion: “Costs of meeting the standards and related factors have
never been considered in setting the national ambient air quality
standards themselves. . . . [T]he focus has been entirely on health,
risk, exposure and damage to the environment. . . . And the
42

See Krier, supra note; see also below.
For example, one that would show no health benefits from a reduction from .3
ppm to .2 ppm, notwithstanding health benefits from a reduction from .4 ppm to
.3 ppm.
44
As noted below, there is reason to think that costs were relevant to the EPA’s
decision not to reduce the particulates standard further than it did, since the data
indicated significant benefits from further reductions. See Table 11, Appendix.
45
See George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit
Consideration of Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in To
Breathe Freely: Risk, Consent, and Air (Mary Gibson ed. 1985). See also the
suggestion in Farber, supra note, about the distinctive “slippage” between law and
reality in the context of environmental law.
46
See 45 Fed. Reg. 55066 (1990).
43
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American public deserves to know whether the air in its cities and
counties is unsafe or not; that question should never be confused
with the separate issues of how long it may take or how much it may
cost to reduce pollution to safe levels. Indeed, to allow costs and
related factors to influence the determination of what levels protect
public health would be to mislead the American public in a very
fundamental way.”47
Only insiders know for certain whether EPA does in fact
consider costs in issuing national ambient air quality standards.48 But
consider, by way of contrast and as a possible clue, the
Administrator’s explanation of the 1979 revision of the ozone
standard:
“The Clean Air Act, as the Administrator interprets it,
does not permit him to take factors such as cost or
attainability into account in setting the standard; it is to be
a standard that will adequately protect public health. He
recognizes that controlling ozone to very low levels is a task
that will have significant impact on economic and social
activities. This recognition causes him to reject as an option
the setting of a zero-level standard . . . However, it is public
health, and not economic impact, that must be the
compelling factor in the decision.”49
This explanation, difficult to follow though it is, is most
naturally taken as suggestion that despite the nominal irrelevance of
cost, costs do matter in the context of standard-setting for
nonthreshold pollutants.
With respect to state-by-state variations, there is little question
that the exceedingly high costs of attainment will, for many states,
47

Testimony of Carol Browner before the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, Feb. 12, 1997.
48
As noted, some evidence is provided by the EPA’s failure to require more
stringent regulation of particulates, in spite of the fact that on the EPA’s own
numbers, more stringent regulation might have provided $4 billion in increased
benefits. See Table 11, Appendix. If this was possible, why did the EPA not
require it, if not because of some cost consciousness?
49
See 45 Fed. Reg. at 55072.
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produce frequent violations of national requirements—and this has
in fact turned out to be the case.50 Several decades after the initial
issuance of ambient air quality standards for ozone, for example, over
50 million people live in areas that are frequently in violation of
national standards.51 Smaller numbers—but still many millions—of
people live in nonattainment areas for other pollutants.52 Indeed it is
contemplated, by the 1990 revision of the Act, that one of the
nation’s largest urban areas, Los Angeles, will not be in compliance
until 2010 at the earliest.53
The upshot is that in theory, the Act requires nationally
uniform standards; but in practice, it authorizes an enormous
amount of variation among states. National standards have mostly
served not as real law, but as targets or aspirations54—flexible goals to
which the federal government can point without, however, insisting
on compliance unless or until it is reasonable. The aspirational
quality of national standards has led Congress to enact an
increasingly complex set of provisions for nonattainment areas,
provisions that anticipate compliance in certain areas over a period of
many years and that, in practice, therefore recognize the existence of
reasonable variations across states.55
50

There are many discussions. See, e.g., Farber, supra note; John Dwyer, The
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1183 (1995);
James Krier, On the Topology of Unifom Environmental Standards in a Federal
System—And Why It Matters, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1226 (1995); Eads, supra note; see
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal
Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 1429 (1978).
51
See Davies and Mazurek, supra, at 17.
52
Id. (showing about nine million people live in areas not meeting national
standards for particulates; about eleven million live in areas not meeting national
standards for carbon monoxide; and about five million live in areas not meeting
standards for lead).
53
42 U.S.C. 7511 et seq. (nonattainment program).
54
See George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit
Consideration of Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Stanadrds, in To
Breathe Freely: Risk, Consent, and Air (Mary Gibson ed. 1985); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental
Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1429 (1978).
55
42 USC § 7511.

17

Clean Air Act

This point leads to a more general one, bearing on cost-benefit
balancing as well as federalism. The EPA’s official position that
standard-setting is cost-blind is complemented by explicit statements
to the effect that cost, efficiency, and feasibility are relevant in
making choices about compliance.56 In a way these statements are
puzzling, for the Supreme Court has held that cost, and infeasibility,
are irrelevant to the EPA’s decision whether to approve state
implementation plans.57 But the EPA appears to acknowledge that
state implementation plans will themselves consider control costs,
and also that cost will be relevant in setting schedules for
compliance.58
Finally, EPA must make hard choices about how safe is safe
enough—choices that involve not merely the facts, but also
evaluative judgments about acceptable degrees of risk. A central
question has to do with the ingredients of any judgment that a
certain risk is too high; there are many important questions here.
These include:
•
•

56

The size of the population at risk, that is, whether 100,000, a
million, or tens of millions of people are at risk.59
The nature of the population at risk, e.g., whether it involves a
large number of children, whether only elderly people are
affected, whether those affected have a preexisting condition,
such as asthma.60 An important question is whether any “lives
saved” number would involve young people or old people; there
is less need for a policy that would (say) increase life expectancy
by one year for those over 80 than for a policy that would
increase life expectancy by sixty years for those under 10. This
point suggests that the EPA might reasonably concern itself not
with lives saved, but with life-years saved, a point to which I will
return.

See Statement of Carol Browner, supra note.
See Union Electric v. EPA, 427 US 246 (1976).
58
See the outline of the EPA’s “Common Sense Implementation Plan” in Robert
Percival et al., Environmental Regulation, 1998 Supplement 123-24 (1998).
59
See the discussion of lead in R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts
(1983).
60
See id.
57
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•

•

The likelihood of harm for particular members of the affected
population, that is, whether the likelihood of incurring harm is
1 in 1000, 1 in 10,000 or 1 in a million.61 Thus, for example, the
plurality of the Supreme Court held, in the Benzene Case,62 that
OSHA to regulate only “significant risks,” and that a risk of one
in a billion could not count as significant.63 OSHA now
concludes that a lifetime annual risk of 1/1000 would count as
significant.64 But undoubtedly the importance of addressing
such a risk will depend on other factors, notably including the
size of the affected population.
The severity of the risk, e.g., whether it involves cancer or
mortality risks, or increased hospital admissions, bronchitis,
respiratory symptoms, lost work days, or what the EPA calls
minor restricted activity days (MRADs).65

EPA considers all of these questions in issuing national
standards.66 But EPA has developed no clear guidelines to discipline
its judgment about when one or another level of regulation is
appropriate. It has not said, for example, that if 100,000 people face
a cancer risk of 1/1000, regulation is presumptively desirable, but if
10,000 face a 1/1000 chance of minor respiratory problems,
regulation is presumptively not desirable.67 A reading of EPA’s
61

See Statement of Carol Browner, supra note.
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607
(1980).
63
Id. at 612.
64
See Building and Constructions Trades v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1265 (DC Cir
1988).
65
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis
12-43 (1996).
66
See, e.g., Testimony of Carol Browner Before the House Science Energy and
Environment Subcommittee, May 21, 1997:”I determined that setting an
appropriate air quality standard for a pollutant for which there is no discernible
threshold means that factors such as the nature and severity of the health effects
involved, and the nature and size of the sensitive populations exposed, are very
important.” See also the discussion of lead in Melnick, supra note; the discussion
of ozone in Landy et al., at 44-82
67
Compare OSHA, which has said that if a risk is 1/1000, regulation will be
presumed desirable and the risk will be found significant, see below.
62
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voluminous documents on the major air pollutants provides an
enormous amount of data, but little information on the answers that
would trigger a decision to increase or decrease regulation. As we
will see, all of the various points noted above might reasonably be
turned into a kind of global figure, “quality-adjusted life years,”
attempted to quantify the various benefits from regulation.68
One final note: An obvious and important question has to do
with the distributional effects of national ambient air quality
standards. Who bears the costs? Who receives the benefits? Full
information is not available. But an early study finds that under the
Act, poor people, and African-Americans, are net gainers, whereas
wealthy people, and whites, are net losers69—perhaps not a shocking
finding in light of the fact that many of the adverse effects of air
pollution are concentrated in large cities.
III. Revising National Standards,
and the Tyranny of the Status Quo
In 1971, EPA issued six national standards, governing ozone,
particulates, carbon monocide, nitrogen oxides, and particulates
2.5.70 In 1978, EPA issued a seventh standard, involving lead; it did
so as a result of a court order.71 These seven regulations amount to
the centerpiece of EPA’s regulatory system for the control of
national ambient air quality.
Of course it would be extremely surprising if the standards
originally adopted in 1971 and 1978 turn out to survive new
scientific evidence, and many people have urged that adjustments are
desirable, in the direction of both tightening and loosening existing
requirements. Congress has thus created an “agency-forcing”
mechanism designed to require EPA reconsideration of primary an
secondary standards. Under the Act, EPA is required to review the
relevant criteria and standards at least once every five years, and to
68

Richard Zeckhauser and Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 L
& Contemp Probs 5 (1976).
69
See Henry M. Peskin, Environmental Policy and the Distribution of Benefits
and Costs, in Current Issues in Environmental Policy (Paul Portney ed. 1978).
70
See Appendix for details.
71
See id.
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revise them “as appropriate” under the statutory guidelines.72 EPA is
specifically required to consider, and to explain any significant
departures from, the recommendations of CASAC, an independent
committee established specifically in order to advise the
Administrators on air quality criteria and standards.73
So much for the statutory requirements; the possibility of
litigation raises further complexities. The most general point is that
EPA is highly vulnerable to suits by those seeking more stringent
controls and new regulations based on apparent evidence of hazards
at existing levels.74 If EPA does not act within the statutory period,
or if it decides not to impose more stringent controls, it will
predictably be faced by a suit from environmental organization—one
that, in view of likely scientific evidence, has a nontrivial chance of
success.75 This is so especially in light of a recent judicial suggestion
that the Administrator may be barred from declining “to establish a
margin of safety in the face of documented adverse health effects.”76
But the EPA is also highly vulnerable to challenges by industry
whenever it tightens a standard. Creative lawyers have a quite good
chance of successfully challenging an EPA regulation whether it has
tightened, or refused to tighten, existing standards.77
It is therefore possible to venture a prediction: The day will
eventually come when the same court of appeals holds that the EPA
has behaved unlawfully both for regulating above a certain level and
also for not regulating below that level! The basic point is that the
centrality of litigation to environmental protection creates a new
form of tyranny of the status quo—a great deal of inertia in favor of
the existing regulatory framework, whatever its content. The general
72

42 USC 7409(d)(1).
Id. 7409 (d)(2(B), 7607 (d)(3).
74
For recent evidence, see, e.g., American Lung Association v. EPA, 134 F.2d
388 (DC Cir 1998); American Trucking Co. v. EPA. 175 F2d 1027 (DC Cir
1999); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA< 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
75
See, e.g., American Lung Association v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (DC Cir 1998)
(requiring EPA to give a better justifictaion for its failure to establkish a new
standard for sulfur dioxide emissions).
76
Id. at 393 (leaving the issue undecided on the ground that the Administrator did
not adequately explain her judgment that no public health threat exists).
77
See, e.g., American Trucking, supra.
73
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problem for modern administrative law is that because of the
complexity of the scientific evidence, skilled advocates are highly
likely to be able to find a serious problem in the agency’s rationale, a
factor that makes rulemaking extremely cumbersome and
increasingly encourages agencies to avoid it altogether.78
IV. The Record
Thus far it might be tempting to be quite skeptical of the
Act—to think that it rests on false assumptions, that it foolishly
ignores costs and state-by-state variations, that it invites excessive
litigation, and that it is an extremely crude foundation for regulatory
policy. There is considerable sense in these skeptical reactions. But it
must also be acknowledged that the Act has done a great deal of
good—indeed, that reductions in air pollution can plausibly be
counted among the substantial success stories in regulatory
government in the last half-century.79 The good news is that for all
of the pollutants, there have been large improvements in ambient air
quality. Consider the Table 1.
Even the cost-benefit ratio appears to be quite good, at least
according to most studies. A general review contains many criticisms
of American efforts at environmental protection, but concludes that
“the benefits of the Clean Air Act seem clearly the outweigh the
costs.”80 Thus a study of EPA rule between 1990 and 1995 found
that the costs outweighed the benefits by no less than $70 billion.81
On the other hand, better tools could have produced similar
results at a far lower cost. Thus there is evidence that with better
tools, especially economic incentives, EPA could have achieved that
same benefits at one-quarter of the costs.82 There is also a problem of
poor priority-setting. EPA’s own studies suggest that it is not
devoting resources to the most serious problems and indeed that
78
See Richard Pierce, Seven Ways to De-Ossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Ad. L.
Rev. 59, 60-62 (1995).
79
See, e.g., Gregg Easterbrook, A Moment On the Earth 181-83 (1996).
80
J. Clarence Davies and Jan Mazuerk, Regulating Pollution: Does the US System
Work? 31 (1996).
81
Id.
82
See Tom Tietenburg, Emissions Trading (1985).
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inadequate priority-setting is a particular problem for clear air
regulation, where large problems (such as indoor air pollution)
receive relatively little attention.83 An important task for the future is
to ensure that EPA devotes limited public and private resources to
the most serious environmental hazards.84
Table 1. Air Quality and Emissions Trends 1986-95
Air quality change (%)

Emissions change (%)

Carbon monoxide

-37

-16

Lead

-78

-32

Nitrogen dioxide

-14

-3 (nitrogen Oxides)

Ozone

-6

-9 (VOCs)

PM-10*

-22

-17

Sulfur dioxide

-37

-18

*PM-10 changes are based on 1988-95 data.
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1996. National Air Quality and
Emissions Trends Report, 1995. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
Research. EPA 454/R-96-005. Research Triangle Park, North Carolina; p. 1.

V. Particulates and Ozone at EPA: A Case in Point
These issues are hard to understand in the abstract; it will be
useful to understand them in light of the EPA’s recent effort o revise
its regulations governing particulates and ozone. Notably, the origins
of the new particulates standards can be found not in an independent
decision by the EPA, but in a 1993 suit by the American Lung
Association, which sought to compel EPA to complete its review of
the PM standard.85 The district court ordered EPA to issue a
83

Davies and Mazurek, supra, at 24-30.
This is a general theme of Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1993).
In a claim of direct relevance to the central claims of this Article, Breyer rejects the
idea of congressional priority-setting and makes a plea instead for executive branch
oversight of regulatory activity. See id. at 90-102.
85
Citation
84
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proposed rule by November 29, 1996, and a final rule by July 18,
1997,
The final rules for particulates and ozone were based on a
massive amount of evidence, involving thousands of pages of
documents. Here are the key points in the EPA’s justification, which
raise recurring issues about standard-setting in the environmental
arena.
•

•

•

86

A general review of the evidence suggests that there would be
both high benefits and high costs from the new particulates
standard.86 For the new ozone standard, both costs and benefits
would be significantly lower.87 EPA offered a great deal of detail
about the harms apparently caused by particulates and ozone at
existing levels. It also acknowledged uncertainties in the
evidence. There are extensive discussions of the scientific
literature.
EPA ultimately chose a standard of 15/65 for particulates—more
specifically, an annual standard, for PM sub2.5, of 15 mg/m3,
based on the three-year average of annual arithmetic PM sub2.5
concentrations; it also set an hourly standard of 65 mg/m3, based
on the three-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour PM
sub2.5 concentrations.
EPA set a .08 ppm standard for ozone averaged over an eighthour period, replacing the previous 0.12 ppm standard, averaged
over a one hour period.. In an illustrative comment,
Administrator Browner publicly defended the 0.08 ppm standard
for ozone “because, though it is in the middle of the range
recommended for consideration by CASAC and the EPA staff
paper, as a policy choice it reflects the lowest level recommended
by individual CASAC panel members and it is the lowest level
tested and shown to cause effects in controlled human-exposure
health studies.”88 In its explanation of the final rules, the EPA
did not defend these selections against plausible alternatives. The
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), required by Executive Order

See Appendix, Table 10.
See Appendix, Table 11.
88
See Browner testimony, supra note.
87
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12866,89 also discusses a more stringent and a less stringent
alternative—particulates standards of 16/65 and 15/50, and
ozone standards of 0.08 5th max and 0.08 3rd max.90 This
discussion was designed to give a sense of the cost and benefits of
the alternatives.
The EPA’s own public justification is extremely long and
detailed but in important respects vague and conclusory. It is
filled with legalistic arguments, with reports on specific studies
having unclear implications for the particular issue of what
standard to select, and with qualitative judgments that leave a
great deal of uncertainty about the magnitude of the effects.91
The heart of the EPA’s analysis is as follows. 92 (I discuss
particulates as an illustration.) The EPA begins by referring to
“the greatly expanded body of community epidemiological
studies.”93 This evidence shows a range of adverse health effects,
including premature mortality; and there is also evidence that
children, the elderly, and asthmatics are most vulnerable to these
effects. More particular evidence emerges from quantitative risk
estimates from two “example cities,” estimates that include a
judgment that existing standards create residual risks of
“hundreds of premature deaths each year, hundreds to thousands
of respiratory-related hospital admissions, and tens of thousands
of additional respiratory-related symptoms in children.”94 (In an
inadvertantly hilarious qualification, the EPA adds that the
“epidemiological findings cannot be wholly attributed to
inappropriate or incorrect statistical methods, misspecification of
concentration-effect models, biases in study design or
implementation, measurement errors” and the like.) But the
EPA notes that the results “should be interpreted cautiously” and
should be taken to “provide ample reason to be concerned that

62 Fed. Reg.
See Table 11, Appendix.
91
62 Fed. Reg. 38650-38681.
92
62 Fed Reg. 38652 (1997).
93
Id. at 38655.
94
Id.
90
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there are detectable health effects attributable to PM at levels
below the current NAAQS.”95
The EPA’s basic claim is that “the increase in relative risk is
small for the most serious outcomes” but “significant from an
overall public health perspective, because of the large number of
individuals in sensitive populations that are exposed to ambient
as well as the significance of the health effects involved.”96
International evidence, and evaluations by over 1,000 experts,
supported the view that the existing standard was insufficiently
protective.97 Much of the EPA’s discussion involves the fact that
existing evidence does not reveal mechanisms to explain the
range of reported adverse effects.98 And frequently the EPA
repeats what appears to be a key phrase, almost a mantra, to the
effect that the data “provides the basis for decisions on standard
levels that would reduce risk sufficiently to protect public health
with an adequate margin of safety, recognizing that such
standards will not be risk-free.”99
To the EPA’s credit, it does offer some discussion of both less
stringent and more stringent alternatives.100 But the discussion is
quite brief, especially considering the centrality of the
comparative question. As against the less stringent possibilities,
EPA says that “despite well recognized uncertainties, the
consistency and coherence of the epidemiological evidence and
the seriousness of the health effects require a more protective
response.”101 As against those who argued for more stringent
regulation, EPA said that “the inherent scientific uncertainties
are too great” and also that such regulation “might result in
regulatory programs that go beyond those that are needed to
effectively reduce risks to public health.”102 Studies “provide some

Id. at 38656.
Id. at 38657.
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., id. at 38664-38665.
99
Id. at 38665.
100
Id. at 38674-38677.
101
Id. at 38665.
102
Id. at 38675.
96

Chicago Working Paper in Public Law and Legal Theory 26

•

•

103

suggestion of risks extending to lower concentrations, but they
do not provide a sufficient basis for establishing a lower annual
standard level.”103 Because this point is so important, it is
worthwhile noting that the EPA spoke in similar terms for
ozone, saying that more stringent regulation would produce
more “certain . . . effects, [that] while judged to be adverse, are
transient and reversible, and the more serious effects, with
greater immediate and potential long-term impacts on health are
less certain, both as to the percentage of individuals exposed to
various concentrations who are likely to experience such effects
and as to the long-term significance of these effects.”104
Hence any reader is likely to be puzzled about exactly why EPA
chose the particular regulations it did—about why it did not
regulate either somewhat more or somewhat less. A special
puzzle is why the EPA did not impose more stringent controls
on particulates; the Regulatory Impact Analysis shows that a
more stringent regulation would have produced $4 billion in
increased health benefits.105 The problem is not that the EPA
was careless or off-hand; its exhaustive documentation was
anything but that. The problem is that in the explanation
accompanying the final rules, EPA did not attempt to quantify
the risks under competing standards, nor did it show the basic
value judgment that would deem one risk too high, another risk
acceptable, and another risk too low (that is, below the level
requisite to protect the public health.)
In many ways, the most informative document is the RIA. This
is the most informative document because it provides actual
numbers on the benefit (including nonmonetized and monetized
quantities) and cost sides. It is also a tribute to Executive Order
12866, requiring cost-benefit analysis even when CBA cannot be
the basis for decision. The problem is that in its justification,
EPA made little use of this document. Indeed, the RIA was
written by a contractor, not by EPA personnel, and it had little

Id.
62 Fed. Reg at 38,868/2.
105
See appendix, table 11. Note that this compares the highest benefit estimate;
unfortunately, the RIA does not give lowest bound benefits estimates for the two
alternatives.
104
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or no influence on the ultimate decision. Some of the benefits
calculations appear to have been rejected by EPA itself.
Nonetheless, the RIA provides the only systematic discussion of
the consequences of the approach chosen and of alternative
approaches. Here is some of what the RIA says:
The new particulates regulation would prevent 350 annual
mortalities; 6,800 cases of chronic bronchitis; 1,100 cases of
acute bronchitis; about 1200 hospital admissions averted, from,
for example congestive heart failure (130) and respiratory
problems (470 cases averted); 106,000 lost work days prevented;
and 879,000 minor restricted activity days.106
For the selected ozone standard, it finds that the new regulation
would prevent 0-80 deaths; 130 emergency department visits for
asthma, 29,840 acute respiratory symptoms, 0-530 chronic
bronchitis cases, 0-20 hospital admissions for congestive heart
failure, 0 to 50,440 lost work days, 0 to 420,300 minor restricted
activity days.107 (Note that in both cases the RIA specifies a
range, which is a tribute to candor in the midst of scientific
uncertainty.)
All these benefits are monetized: $4.8 million per life saved,
$120,000 per life-year saved, $12,700 per respiratory illness,
$16,600 per congestive heart failure for those over 65, $9000 for
emergency department visits for asthma, $260,000 for chronic
bronchitis, $83 per lost work day, $38 per minor restricted
activity day.108
The overall cost benefit analysis109 shows: for the health
regulation of ozone in 2010, benefits of $0.4 billion (low end
estimate) to $2.1 billion (high end estimate), and costs of $1.1
billion. For particulates, the benefits range from $19 billion to
$104 billion, whereas the costs are anticipated to be $8.6 billion.
A noteworthy point is that the ozone rule might have negative
net benefits of –$0.7 billion, if the low end estimate is correct;
note also that if the health benefits of ground-level ozone

Appendix, table 2.
Appendix, table 3.
108
Appendix, table 4.
109
Regulatory Impact Analysis at 13.4.
107
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(discussed below) are included in the calculation, the negative net
benefits—or more simply net costs—of the rule are higher still.
(In an unfortunate typographical error in the crucial table, the
net benefits are described as $0.7 billion - $1.0 billion, rather
than $-0.7 billion - $1 billion.110)
The RIA also suggests the costs and benefits of the two
alternatives.111 The more stringent particulates standard would
have high end benefits of $108 billion and costs of $9.4 billion;
the less stringent would have high end benefits of $90 and costs
of $5.5 billion.112 The less stringent ozone standard would have
high end benefits of $1.6 billion and costs of 0.9 billion; the
more stringent would have high end benefits of $2.9 billion and
costs of $1.4 billion.113 The most noteworthy point here is that
by the EPA’s own accounting, the more stringent particulates
standard would have produced $4 billion in greater benefits (on
the high end estimate). This would seem to count as a substantial
improvement in public health, especially considering the fact that
each life is valued at $4.8 million; translated into lives, the more
stringent regulation would prevent more than 200 additional
deaths each year. EPA did not square this conclusion with its
decision not to choose more stringent regulation. Indeed, it
seems clear that EPA’s own calculations showed that a tighter
particulates standard would have produced far greater health
benefits than the ozone standard; this leaves a serious
unexplained anomaly in the two standards taken together.114 A
possible explanation for not tightening the particulates standard
is that the consensus of CASAC members did not support doing
so, a consensus that raises questions about the RIA itself; but
EPA did not offer a “benefits analysis” that would resolve these
uncertainties.

Id. at 13.4
Id. at 13-2, 13-3.
112
Id. at 13-3.
113
Id. at 13-4.
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See Randall Lutter and Christopher DeMuth, Ozone and the Constitution At
EPA, On the Issues 3 (July 1999).
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A serious gap in the RIA is that it does not give low end
estimates for the benefits associated with the alternatives; only
high-end estimates are given for these. For the options actually
chosen, a range is specified, which greatly assists assessment of
the EPA’s judgment. But without the range, it is hard to
compare the options not chosen. An additional problem,
reflected in the EPA’s explanation as a whole, is the absence of a
detailed assessment—even a wholly benefits-based
assessment—of why the options that were chosen were deemed
superior to those that were not chosen.

In this light, what overall evaluation would be reasonable? If the
EPA’s conclusions are corrrect, the particulates regulation promises
significant benefits and the ozone regulation promises relatively
small benefits. The basic problem is that the agency has not
explained, in concrete terms. why it chose one level of regulation
rather than another. Now let us shift to the nondelegation issue.
VI. The Path of the Law
If we can just get our legislators to legislate we’ll be able to understand
their goals well enough. I’m not saying we may not still end up with a
fair number of clowns as representatives, but at least then it will be
because clowns are what we deserve.
John Hart Ely115
The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure. . . . The time
has come for the courts to acknowledge that the non-delegation doctrine
is unsatisfactory . . . .
Kenneth Culp Davis116

A. The Old Nondelegation Doctrine: One Good Year, Two Hundred and
Two Bad Years
Despite its extremely infrequent use, the old nondelegation
doctrine should be quite familiar. In a nutshell, it requires Congress
to state an “intelligible principle” by which to guide and limit agency
115

John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 134 (1981).
Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713
(1969).

116

Chicago Working Paper in Public Law and Legal Theory 30
action.117 The motivating idea is that Article I, section 1 vests
legislative power in the Congress and that this vesting cannot be
waived, even if Congress and the public want to do so. If Congress
gives the executive a “blank check,” or states no intelligible principle,
it has violated Article I.
According to a standard view, the nondelegation doctrine was a
core part of the original Constitution, and its abandonment, in the
aftermath of the New Deal, represented a kind of capitulation to
perceived national needs.118 I believe that the Constitution does
contain a nondelegation doctrine; but the standard view is much too
simple. For one thing, there is no express nondelegation doctrine in
the text of the Constitution, which must therefore be counted
ambiguous on the point.119 To be sure, legislative power is vested in
Congress, and it is reasonable to infer that the power thus vested
cannot be given to someone else. But there is no clear textual barrier
to delegations, and in fact there is no explicit evidence that the
framers and ratifiers of the original Constitution believed that it
contained a nondelegation doctrine.120 Actually the early practice
suggested considerable willingness to “delegate” authority. In the
117

See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (DC
1971)
118
See David Schoenbrod, Power and Responsibility (1997); John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust (1981); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 100 Harv. L. Rev. (1995).
119
Compare the German Constitution, which does contain an explicit
nondelegation principle. See Art. 80(1), requiring that the content, purpose, and
extent of the legislative authorization be specified in the statute itself; see also the
discussion in David Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany
125-34 (1995).
120
Consider in this regard the revealingly cavalier treatment of the interpretive
question in Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 Am. U L Rev 345.
347-48 (1987), which attempts to show the constitutional roots of the
nondelegation (a) by showing that John Locke believed in a nondelegation
principle, (b) by emphasizing that the framers believed in Locke’s contractarian
view, and (c) by referring to the Constitution’s provision for lawmaking. None of
this establishes that the framers accepted a nondelegation doctrine. I use this
example because Gellhorn is one of the outstanding administrative law scholars of
the last thirty years, and also an enthusiast for the nondelegation doctrine; his
inability to show a direct constitutional source for the doctrine shows that any
judgment on its behalf is largely a matter of inferences.
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very first year of the Republic, Congress gave the President the
power to grant licenses to trade with the Indian tribes “under such
rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe.”121 The first
Congress also provided for military pensions “under such regulations
as the President of the United States may direct.”122 In neither case
did Congress issue standards by which to limit the President’s
discretion.
The standard view also fits uncomfortably with judicial practice.
It is often remarked that the Supreme Court last used the
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a federal statute in 1935. What
is less often remarked is that the Court first used the nondelegation
doctrine to invalidate to federal statute in exactly the same year. While
earlier cases had suggested the existence of a nondelegation
doctrine,123 the Court upheld a number of broad delegations,124 and
hence for the first 138 years of the nation’s existence—as well as the
last 64 years—no Supreme Court decision struck down a statute on
nondelegation grounds. Let us briefly explore the two decisions of
1935, the nondelegation doctrine’s only good year.
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,125 the Court invalidated a
section of the National Industrial Recovery Act, saying that “the
President is authorize to prohibit the transportation in interstate
commerce” of oil priced in violation of state-imposed production
quotas. The Court said that the defect lay in the absence of
standards specifying exactly when the President was to exercise this
power.126 This is a controversial ruling, fitting poorly with postWorld War II decisions,127 and it is most unlikely that the Court
would follow it today. But the largest decision, one that has not been
121
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overruled even implicitly, was Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States,128
where the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act as
a whole.129 In invalidating the Act, the Court made three critical
points. First, the statutory standards were open-ended and selfcontradictory—no constraint at all on government approval of
“codes.”130 From the statutory language, it was very hard to generate
ceilings and floors on governmental action. Second, the Court said
that the Act essentially delegated public power to private groups.131
Congress could not legitimately authorize private persons to create
law in their preferred form. Because accountable officials did not
“filter” efforts at private lawmaking, this did not merely raise the
spectre of faction, it was the thing itself—the cooptation of public
power by self-interested private groups. Third, and in a discussion of
particular relevance to the general subject here, the Court
distinguished other statutes, most notably the Federal Trade
Commission Act, partly by reference to the procedural safeguards
provided by those statutes. “What are ‘unfair methods of
competition’ are thus to be determined in particular instances, upon
evidence, in the light of particular competitive conditions and of
what is found to be a specific and substantial public interest. To
make this possible, Congress set up a special procedure.”132 As we
will see, the seeds of the new nondelegation doctrine can be found in
this passage.
In the decades since Schechter Poultry, however, nondelegation
challenges have been routinely repudiated.133 Indeed, the Court has
upheld some apparently extreme grants of authority to the executive
128
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branch.134 But there have been a few conflicting signals. In the most
visible opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that Occupational
Safety and Health Act should be struck down on nondelegation
grounds.135 In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute,136 better known as the Benzene case, the basic question was
whether the Act called for (a) cost-benefit balancing (as urged in a
concurrence by Justice Powell),137 (b) demonstration that any
regulated risk be “significant” (as urged in the plurality opinion of
four justices, written by Justice Stevens138), or (c) agency action
whenever there was any risk at all (as urged in a dissenting opinion
of four justices, written by Justice Marshall139). In Justice Rehnquist’s
view, Congress had made no choice among the three alternatives.140
The statute was therefore an unconstitutional delegation. Justice
Rehnquist contended that the statute was a kind of “mirage,” in
which Congress “simply avoid[ed] a choice which was both
fundamental for purposes of the statute and yet politically so divisive
that the necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if not
impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge.”141
Notably, Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion also referred to the
nondelegation doctrine, not to invalidate the Act but as a tool of
statutory construction.142 In the plurality’s view, the agency’s position
would allow the agency such massive power over the private sector as
to be a possibly unconstitutional delegation of power.143 Partly for
this reason, the Court read the statute to require OSHA to show a
“significant risk” before it could undertake regulation.144 For the
134
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plurality, then, the nondelegation doctrine operated as a kind of clear
statement principle, requiring Congress to speak unambiguously if it
sought to give (what the Court saw as) open-ended authority to
administrators.145 Note, however, that the Court left the definition
of the key term—“significant risk”—to the agency, and that OSHA
has yet to give a rule-like understanding of that highly ambiguous
term.146
In the immediate aftermath of the Benzene Case, there were
occasional lower court suggestions that the nondelegation doctrine
was “no longer . . . moribund.”147 A handful of lower courts cases
have now invoked the doctrine. Thus in Massieu v. Reno,148 a distict
court struck down a provision of a federal deportation statute saying
that “an alien whose presence or activities in the United States the
Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe would have
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the
United States is deportable.” On the court’s view, this was an openended grant of power, because the notion of “”potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences” could be construed in
numerous different ways, thus raising a risk of arbitrariness. And in
South Dakota v. Department of Interior,149 a court of appeals
invalidated the Indian Reorganization Act insofar as it authorized
the secretary of the Interior “in his discretion, to acquire . . . any
interest in lands . . . within or without existing reservations . . . for
the purpose of providng land for Indians.” But these are extremely
unusual cases, and it is unlikely that other courts would follow them,
even on identical facts.
145
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B. What, if Anything, is the Nondelegation Doctrine For?
The opinions of Justice Rehnquist and the plurality in the
Benzene Case have spurred renewed interest in the nondelegation
doctrine, and many have argued for its revival.150 There has thus
been a spirited debate over what purposes such a revival would serve,
and whether, in light of those purposes, a revival would be
justified.151
1. Nondelegation values
It is possible to isolate several possibilities. First and foremost,
the doctrine is designed to promote a distinctive kind of
accountability—the kind of accountability that comes from requiring
specific decisions from a deliberative body reflecting the views of
representatives from various states of the union. This is hardly to say
that the executive branch lacks accountability; of course the
President is subject to the will of people.152 But the nondelegation
doctrine should be associated less with accountability in the abstract
than with the particular constitutional goal of ensuring a deliberative
democracy, one that involves not only accountability but also
reflectiveness.153 The vesting of lawmaking power in Congress is
designed to ensure the combination of deliberation and
accountability that comes from saying that government power
cannot be brought to bear on individuals unless diverse
representatives, from diverse places, have managed to agree on the
details. Consider, as an extreme example, the early decision by the
German legislature to confer on Adolf Hitler the power to rule by
150
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“decree”; this delegation made possible lawmaking exercises that
would otherwise have been extremely cumbersome, and hence
removed an important check on arbitrary rule.154
A closely related point has to do with the extent to which law
and particularly national legislation can amount to an infringement
on liberty. If no law may be brought to bear against the public unless
diverse members of Congress have been able to agree on a particular
form of words, then perhaps there is an important safeguard of
freedom. The underlying idea is that people may not be subject to
national legal constraints unless and until there has been specific
legislative authorization for the constraints. This idea can in turn be
associated with social contract theory, allowing people to maintain
certain private law rights unless there has been explicit authorization
for what would otherwise be a common law wrong.155
The nondelegation doctrine also promotes rule of law values.
Indeed, the doctrine can be understood as a kind of “backdoor” voidfor-vagueness doctrine, serving the same fundamental goals.156 It
154
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does this, first, by promoting planning by those subject to law, by
giving them a sense of what is permitted and what is forbidden. It
does this, second, by cabining the discretionary authority of
enforcement officials, who might otherwise act abusively or
capriciously. In all these ways the nondelegation doctrine might be
seen as a safeguard against the framers’ core concerns, self-interested
representation and factional power. These points can be collected
with the suggestion that the nondelegation doctrine reflects the
Constitution’s commitment to dual-branch lawmaking—a
commitment that cabins arbitrary power, and promotes deliberation
as well as accountability, by ensuring that governmental authority
can be exercised only when both the legislature and the executive
have made a particular decision to that effect.
2. Against the nondelegation doctrine
Those who challenge the doctrine emphasize several points.
Part of their concern is institutional, involving judicial competence
rather than the doctrine on its merits.157 The difference between a
permissible and impermissible delegation—between “legislative” and
“executive” conduct—is one of degree, not one of kind. From what
has been said thus far, it should be clear that the line involves not
anything qualitative but the precise amount of delegated discretion,
and there is no simple metric to tell when how much discretion is
too much. It is for this reason that Justice Scalia, among others, has
urged that the nondelegation is largely unenforceable by the federal
judiciary, simply because it is not subject to principled judicial
application.158 If understood in these terms, the doctrine might be
taken as a judicially underenforced constitutional norm—but a
constitutional norm nonetheless.
These are largely institutional points; but other objections cut
deeper against the doctrine. Sometimes Congress has good reasons
to delegate. It may lack relevant information, not only about
157
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pollutants like particulates and ozone, but about the social
consequences of one or another approach to regulation. It may also
be aware of the existence of rapidly changing circumstances, which
may make any particular approach increasingly anachronistic. For a
multimember body, there are serious problems in achieving closure
on any particular course of action, and the result can be to push law
in the direction of incompletely specified abstractions.159 These
points are independent of the phenomenon of delegating to escape
the political consequences of specificity, a phenomenon that
undoubtedly plays a large role as well.160
The latter point is often taken as a reason for invigorating the
nondelegation doctrine in the name of accountability161; but Jerry
Mashaw has urged that administrators should be making political
decisions, precisely on grounds of accountability.162 As Mashaw
notes, agencies are themselves politically accountable through their
relationship to the President. Indeed, public choice theory may well
suggest that Congress is more, not less, susceptible to factional
power than bureaucrats acting under the arm of the President. There
is evidence that factional power is most influential precisely when
Congress legislates with particularity.163 In any case the issue cannot
be resolved in the abstract. And it is hard to come up with any a
priori reason why decisions by agencies would be worse, from the
standpoint of promoting social well-being, than decisions by
Congress.
There is an empirical point here. It is not clear that from any
point of view, things have gone systematically better when Congress
is clear than when Congress is not.164 If we ask about promoting
public welfare, or about agency reputation for competence and fairdealing, it appears unimportant to know whether Congress has
159
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spoken with clarity. The Interstate Commerce Commission, for
example, was one of the least well-respected agencies, and it
operated under open-ended statutory terms; the Securities and
Exchange Commission is highly regarded, though its organic statute
is similarly open-ended. The Department of Agriculture is one of
the least well-regarded agencies, and the statutes it administers are
frequently all too clear. The Internal Revenue Service is highly
regarded, and many of the provisions that it must enforce are highly
detailed. In short: There seems to be no link between clear statutory
terms and agency competence or agency contribution to social wellbeing.
3. The centrality of floors and ceilings
Thus it might be questioned whether a reinvigoration of the
nondelegation doctrine would be a sensible response to any of the
problems and pathologies of the modern administrative state.165
Indeed it would be foolish to suggest that such a revival would
ensure better regulatory policy, or even that it would mark a
significant improvement in terms of democratic values. But it would
be almost equally foolish to suggest that the nondelegation doctrine
deserves to play no role at all in the constitutional regime.
Contrary to Mashaw’s suggestion, administrators are often
weakly accountable to the President (or the electorate), and in any
case Congress has a distinctive kind of accountability, and it is that
kind of accountability that leads to its role as the institution
entrusted with the making of federal law. The Constitution would
not tolerate a legislative grant of authority to the President to enact
such environmental regulations as he deemed best, even though it is
not clear that such a grant would lead to inferior environmental
policies. The special form of political accountability anticipated by
Article I, section 1 does call for limitations on executive discretion.
As we shall see, this requirement is best promoted by clear statement
principles—the real place where contemporary American law
recognizes a nondelegation doctrine, and where that doctrine now
flourishes—and also by judicial invalidation in the rare cases where
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even aggressive statutory construction is able to identify neither
floors nor ceilings.
IV. The New Nondelegation Doctrine
Even with all its Frankensteinlike warts, knobs, and (concededly)
dangers, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from
the ice.
Antonin Scalia166
In our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability
to delegate power under broad general directives.
Mistretta v. United States167

A. Kenneth Culp Davis’ Interesting Innovation
Beginning with an important essay in 1969,168 Kenneth Culp
Davis proposed a new approach to the nondelegation doctrine. In its
original form, he claimed, the doctrine was dead, and quite properly
so. Congress could not be expected to legislate specifically, and it
should not be asked to do so. But much of the doctrine could be
rescued, and could perform a salutary function, if agencies could be
required to develop protections against uncontrolled discretionary
power, and to adhere to them. “The key should no longer be
statutory words; it should be the protections that administrators in
fact provide, irrespective of what the statutes say or fail to say.”169
Thus Davis urged “a much broader requirement, judicially enforced,
that as far as is practicable administrators must structure their
discretionary power through appropriate safeguards and must
confine and guide their discretionary power through standards,
principles, and rules.”170 Davis thus argued for proposed a shift from
a requirement of statutory clarity to a requirement of administrative
clarity. In Davis’ view, a central problem for the regulatory state is
166
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excessive discretion—a system of “discretionary justice.”171 The
remedy would be to require administrators to limit their own room
to maneuver.
The consequence of this requirement would be that rule of law
values would operate at the agency level. This would promote
predictability and minimize the arbitrary exercise of power.
Synthesizing a long period of work, Davis wrote that “the basic
purpose of the traditional non-delegation doctrine is unsatisfactory
and should be changed. It should no longer be either to prevent
delegation of legislative power or to require meaningful statutory
standards.”172 In Davis’ view, the “crucial consideration is not what
the statute says but what the administrators do. The safeguards that
count are the ones the administrators use, not the ones mentioned in
the statute. . . . The alteration in the nondelegation doctrine in this
respect can be a rather small one: The courts should continue their
requirement of meaningful standards, except that when the
legislative body fails to prescribe the require standards for
discretionary action in particular cases, the administrators should be
allowed to satisfy the requirement by prescribing them within a
reasonable time.”173
Davis was not entirely clear about the legal source for this
proposed requirement. He did not say whether courts should act
pursuant to the due process clause, Article I, the APA, or the
common law. In a remarkably short treatment, he said that
“[p]erhaps the non-delegation doctrine will gradually turn into a
facet of due process . . . But in the longer term, perhaps the
constitutional base will give way to a common-law base.”174 This was
less than a decade before the Court’s ruling in Vermont Yankee. the
Erie Railroad of administrative procedure, that there is no common
law of administrative law.175 Though Davis did not specify the source
of his requirement, he clearly contemplated judicial enforcement of
his innovation.
171
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B. The (Early) Fate of an Idea
It is not clear to what extent subsequent judicial developments
were actually influenced by Davis’ suggestion. But it is clear that in
the 1970s, a number of cases required administrators to generate
rules and criteria, and several such cases seemed to adopt an
approach quite close to that proposed by Davis.176
In a series of cases, courts held that an agency violated the due
process clause if it did not generate criteria by which to limit its own
exercise of discretion. Thus, for example, courts held that liquor
licenses could not be given out without publicly articulated criteria,177
and that agencies were constitutionally obliged to say something
about the grounds on which they would give out public housing.178
But by far the most prominent use of the idea came in Judge
Leventhal’s opinion in the celebrated case upholding the wage and
price freeze statute, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally.179
The remarkably broad statutory provision at issue authorized
the President “to issue such orders and regulations as he may deem
appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wage and salaries at levels not
less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970.”180 Thus Congress
essentially gave no guidance to the President, at least not in the text
of the statute. A key part of Judge Leventhal’s response—and a
somewhat desperate one under the circumstances—was to suggest
that there was a requirement that the executive develop “subsidiary”
administrative law, and stick to it.181 Thus a “feature that blunts the
‘blank check’ rhetoric is the requirement that any action taken by the
Executive under the law, subsequent to the freeze, must be in
176
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accordance with further standards as developed by the Executive.”182
This requirement was said to be “inherent in the Rule of Law and
implicit in the Act.”183 Thus Judge Leventhal emphasized the
“requirement of subsidiary administrative policy, enabling Congress,
the courts, and the public to assess the Executive’s adherence to the
ultimate legislative standard.”184 In his view, “there is an ongoing
requirement of intelligible administrative policy that is corollary to
and implementing of the legislature’s ultimate standard and
objective.”185
There are several points to notice about this opinion. For those
steeped in regulatory policy, the major constraints on the President
would come not from the idea of the Rule of Law but from the
particular context and background.186 These suggested that the Act
was a response to perceived “cost-push” inflation, that is, a situation
in which wage demands and price increases had created a kind of
inflationary spiral, in which the anticipation of one would fuel an
increase in the other. Whatever the merits of this understanding of
the economic situation, it suggests a real constraint on the
President’s authority: He may not favor particular industries or
particular workers; all of his decisions must be made in terms of the
underlying problem that Congress meant to solve. This point
suggests a much broader one, to which I will return. An
understanding of particular regulatory programs, and their public
rationale, will often lead both courts and agencies to a narrower
understanding of statutory terms, one that will sharply discipline
agency discretion. We might understand this as a more modern
approach to regulatory questions, one that diverts understanding
from the traditional lawyerly concern with “discretion,” writ large,
and shifts the focus to a better understanding of regulatory policy.187
But Judge Leventhal did not take this approach.
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In a sense, the approach that Judge Leventhal chose has a
commonality with Schechter Poultry itself, where, it will be recalled,188
the Court pointed to procedural safeguards in the FTC Act as an
important distinguishing feature. Procedural guarantees can be seen
as a check on arbitrary judgment, operating as a kind of (partial)
surrogate for clear statutory standards. The requirement of subsidiary
administrative law belongs in the same category —finding surrogate
safeguards in anything that operates as a constraint on the
uncontrolled discretion of the administrator.
Notably, Judge Leventhal invoked the requirement of
“subsidiary administrative law” to uphold a statute, not to invalidate
agency action. And in the two decades after Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, the decision was generally understood to provide a tool by
which otherwise troublesome delegations would be upheld.189
Indeed, it can be understood as part of a range of surrogate
safeguards, operating in Davis’ spirit and promoting nondelegation
goals without invoking the nondelegation doctrine.190 Thus much of
the work of the doctrine, and of Davis’ proposal, ultimately came
from judicial review of agency action for arbitrariness. Thus courts
have required extremely detailed justifications for agency rules under
the “hard look” doctrine and in particular they have required
agencies to explain departures from past practices.191 The result has
Vicious Circle (1993). It suggests a significant shift from the legal culture’s
preoccupation with the control of discretion, which is not the central problem for
regulatory policy, toward a better understanding of regulatory substance. In the
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been to require, on nonconstitutional grounds, at least some of what
Davis proposed: clear articulation of agency policy choices, a defense of
those choices, and a requirement of adherence to those choices unless there
was reason not to do so. But as we will see, these requirements have
been confounded, or proved inadequate, in some modern contexts;
and because of their unanticipated systemic effects on agency
rulemaking, they raise serious difficulties of their own.192
C. The Rise of the New Nondelegation Doctrine
Amalgamated Meat Cutters came to enjoy a rebirth, and also to
be understood differently, in an extremely important case,
International Union, UAW v. OSHA.193 The case involved a largescale regulatory effort by OSHA to protect workers, by “lock-outs”
and by informational “tags,” from the hazards of energy released
from industrial machinery. To simplify a complex story, the
regulation at issue required employers to place a ”lock” on energy
isolating devices connected to the equipment, or, if the equipment
could not be locked or if another approach were equally effective, to
place a warning “tag” on the energy isolating device, saying that
employees should not operate the device until the tag is removed.
The only governing statutory language was remarkably brief. It
said that OSHA should issue regulations “reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or heathful employment and places of
employment.”194 The first question was the meaning of this
apparently open-ended statutory term OSHA said that this language
required it to regulate (a) any “significant risk” to (b) the point of
“feasibility,” that is, to the point where compliance would not be
feasible for the industry, either technologically or economically.195 In
this way, OSHA interpreted the “reasonably necessary or
appropriate” language in a way quite similar to the interpretation of

Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59
(1995)..
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See Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1992).
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938 F.2d 1310 (DC Cir. 1991).
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29 USC 652(8).
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938 F.2d at 1315.
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statute insofar as it governed toxic substances in the Benzene Case.196
Notice that on the agency’s interpretation, at least two ideas require
a great deal of interpretive work. How do we know whether a risk is
“significant”? What are the ingredients of that inquiry? And how do
we know whether an expenditure is “feasible”? Surely feasibility, like
safety, is not an off-on switch. It is not as if at a certain, naturally
identifiable point, an expenditure that had been feasible for some
industry is no longer so.
But the court did not press these points. Instead it said that as
the agency had interpreted the statute, the agency had free-wheeling
authority in individual cases to go from “no standard at all” to
“adopting the most stringent standard feasible.”197 In the court’s
view, the statute, so interpreted, might well violate the
nondelegation doctrine. Hence the court remanded the case to the
agency in order to give it an opportunity to adopt an interpretation
that would be both “reasonable and consistent with the
nondelegation doctrine.”198 Clearly the court, or at least Judge
Williams, wanted the agency to use cost-benefit analysis as the basis
for decision,199 but it did not require that approach. What is
noteworthy here is that the court borrowed the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters idea, requiring agencies to discipline their own discretion
through “subsidiary administrative policy,” so as to hold an agency
construction invalid unless it sufficiently limits agency discretion.
On remand, the agency added to its “significant risk” and
“feasibility” constraints three different points: (1) the standard must
use the most cost-effective protective measures; (2) the agency must
publish an explanation of why any standard differing from an
existing national consensus standard would better promote the
purposes of the Act; and (3) the agency must support its choice of
standard with record evidence and explain any inconsistency with
prior agency practice.200 The agency added that when it identified
any significant risk, it must provide “a high degree of worker
196
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protection,” and would not be allowed to do “nothing at all.”201 Thus
the agency attempted to meet the court’s challenge by suggesting
that on any showing of evidence of harm, there were clear ceilings
and floors to discipline agency discretion.
With evident ambivalence, the court concluded that this was
sufficient to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine.202 The court said that
as construed by the agency, its statutory authority for regulation in
general would be quite close to its authority for toxic substances,
which did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.203 In both cases, an
agency must choose a “high degree of worker protection” once it
finds a “significant risk,” and it could not regulate past the point of
“feasibility.” Even though these notions left a degree of residual
discretion, the agency was not given a blank check, and hence the
statute was acceptable as construed. The question left by the court’s
decision was whether its invocation of the nondelegation doctrine
was a kind of sport, or whether it signalled a broader development in
administrative law.
D. Particulates and Ozone in Court
The EPA’s regulations of particulates and ozone were
challenged on a wide variety of grounds.204 The most ambitious of
the challenges, based on Amalgamated Meat Cutters and International
Union, was a claim that the EPA’s construction of the Act resulted
in an unconstitutional delegation of power. In a remarkable decision,
the court of appeals agreed.205
The court’s analysis was similar to that in International Union.
As the court noted, “the only concentration for ozone and PM that
is utterly risk-free, in the sense of direct health impacts, is zero.”206
201

Id. at 608.
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In fact the court accepted many of these challenges. It held, for example, that
EPA could not enforce its ozone standards, and that the ozone standard was
arbitrary because the agency had not adequately justified its refusal to consider the
health benefits of ground-level ozone, which, it is claimed, helps prevent cancer
and cataracts. See below.
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The problem was therefore that the EPA lacks “any determinate
criterion for drawing lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how
much is too much.”207 To be sure, the EPA pointed to some relevant
considerations: the nature and severity of the adverse health effects,
the size of the sensitive population at risk, and the degree of
uncertainties involved. The court thought it perfectly sensible to
point to these considerations. The problem is that they “do not
themselves speak to the issue of degree.”208 On the court’s view,
“EPA’s formulation of its policy judgment leaves it free to pick any
point between zero and a hair below the concentrations yielding
London’s killer fog.”209
With respect to particulates, the EPA defended its shift from
the existing level of 0.09 to 0.08 on the ground that more people are
exposed to more serious effects at 0.09 than at 0.08. 210 But a shift to
0.07 would be still more effective in decreasing exposure levels, and
“EPA never contradicts the intuitive proposition, confirmed by data
in its Staff Paper, that reducing the standard to that level would
bring about comparable changes.”211 Hence the EPA’s rationale
pointed to no disciplining criteria. To be sure, the EPA said that a
reduction to 0.07 would produce more transient and reversible
effects, and the more serious effects would be less certain at that
level. But this “seems to be nothing more than a statement that
lower exposure levels are associated with lower risk to public
health.”212 The fact that the EPA finds less severe and more
speculative effects at lower levels shows only that “the agency rightly
recognizes that the question is one of degree, but offers no
intelligible principle by which to identify a stopping point.”213
In the most ambitious part of the opinion, the court said that in
order for the EPA to make rational decisions, it must be necessary to
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“assign[] weights” to a “range of ailments short of death.”214 The
court referred with some approval to apparent decisions suggesting
“some readiness to adopt standards that leave non-zero residual risk,”
as, for example, by using clinical criteria to decide what counts “as an
adverse health effect.”215 And likelihood judgments might drawn
“from other areas of the law, such as the familiar ‘more probable than
not’ criterion.” The court emphasized that “a one-size-fits-all
criterion of probability would make little sense.” Thus “all the
relevant variables seem to range continuously from high to low: the
possible effects of pollutants vary from deaths to trivialities, and the
size of the affected population, the probability of an effect, an the
associated uncertainty range from ‘large’ numbers of persons with
point estimates of high probability, to small numbers and vague
ranges of probability.”216 The court added, “Nonetheless, an agency
wielding the power over American life possessed by EPA should be
capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm
that takes into account population affected, severity, and
probability.”217
The court referred in this regard to the approach used by
Oregon in devising a health plan for poor people; Oregon has used
the notion of “quality-adjusted life years” to assess health gains, and
a similar approach might be used to assess health risks. Hence the
Court held that the regulations, as justified, were unlawful; but it left
undecided the question whether they should be vacated, an issue
addressed below.218
VII. Evaluating the New Nondelegation Doctrine
Hard work will be needed to devise and secure the adoption of
reconstitutive solutions to the central overload and political
irresponsibility generated by out prevailing reliance on command law.
The energies of academic lawyers . . . should be centered on this task,
214
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not on supposed constitutional solutions that, in the end, can solve
nothing.
Richard Stewart219
“T]he nondelegation doctrine should be applied only as a second,
perhaps last resort. Initial consideration should be given to reading the
statutory authority of the agencies and the President more narrowly if
the language permits.
Ernest Gellhorn220

A. Is This a Nondelegation Doctrine at All?
1. The appeal of the new doctrine: surrogate safeguards
The new nondelegation doctrine has unquestionable appeal, and
in one respect, it has long historic roots. To see why this is so,
consider the posture of a court presented with a statute that may or
may not amount to an unconstitutional delegation. If the statute
contains open-ended terms, but also requires agencies to act only
after fulfilling elaborate procedural requirements, the nondelegation
concern appears to be diminished. As emphasized in Schechter
Poultry, the procedures serve as surrogate safeguards.
To be sure, procedural rights do not ensure that Congress will
make the fundamental value judgments; in this sense they do not
promote the key purpose of the doctrine. But if the nondelegation
doctrine is designed to promote rights of participation and
accountability, a right to be heard, and to receive a public response to
what is said, can serve some of the goals of the doctrine. As we have
seen, this was part of the rationale on which the Court said, in
Schechter Poultry, that the Federal Radio Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act were unobjectionable, despite their apparently
broad terms.
It is not a long step from this idea—of procedures as surrogate
safeguards—to the notion that if administrators discipline their own
discretion through requirements laid down in advance, an otherwise
troubling delegation might be upheld— Judge Leventhal’s
suggestion in Amalgamated Meat Cutters. While constrained
administrative discretion does not mean congressional lawmaking, it
219
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does tend to promote predictability, consistency, and visibility in law,
and to ensure against ad hoc discretion by administrators, discretion
that might be exercised arbitrarily. This is the sense in which
Amalgamated Meat Cutters can be seen as of a piece with Schechter
Poultry—with procedures and agency self-constraint operating, in
the former case, as a kind of “shield” against nondelegation doctrine
attack.
The innovation in Industrial Union and American Trucking is to
treat the notion of agency self-constraint not as a shield but as a
sword—to suggest that if an agency has not engaged in self-binding
via clear, articulable standards, the nondelegation doctrine has been
violated. An approach of this kind might well increase the
consistency and intelligibility of administrative policy, and it might
make agency decisions more reflective and even on balance better.
As a matter of policy analysis, American Trucking Association is quite
sophisticated, and as we will see, there is a great deal to be said for
encouraging the EPA to attempt a more refined and (to the extent
possible) quantitative assessments of severity of effects, likelihood of
effects, and size of population exposed.221 Such an approach could
well help in the development of “floors” and “ceilings” for EPA
judgment, and an understanding of what counts as the legitimate
“strike zone” could be a substantial improvement in regulatory law.
2. Problems
There are, however, serious problems here.
Taken together, these problems amount to decisive objections
to the new nondelegation doctrine.
(a) Administrative rather than legislative lawmaking
If a statute creates a genuine nondelegation problem, why
would an administrative construction eliminate it? The fundamental
point of the nondelegation doctrine is to ensure legislative rather
than administrative judgments about the content of federal law. It
seems odd to say that a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine
because of how it has been construed by the relevant agency. It is one
thing for a court, eager not to overstep its constitutional role, to
221
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rescue a statute from nondelegation attack by saying that the agency
has construed the statute in such a way as to reduce risks of arbitrary
judgment. It is another thing for a court to invalidate a statute on
nondelegation grounds with the thought that the agency has failed
to construe the statute with sufficient clarity. This idea converts the
nondelegation doctrine into something else altogether—a general
requirement of administrative transparency, a requirement with no
obvious constitutional foundation.
(b) Reinterpretation and discretion
Perhaps the American Trucking court’s answer is that an agency
interpretation can confine administrative discretion, and in that way,
at least, promote some of the purposes of the doctrine, rooted in rule
of law values, including transparency. But there is oddity here too.
Under Chevron,222 agencies are permitted to construe ambiguous
statutory terms, and no agency interpretation is set in stone. Suppose
that in International Union—the lockout-tagout case—a future
OSHA accepted the court’s explicit invitation and decided that costbenefit analysis would be the basis for regulatory judgments. Would
this be unlawful? Surely not. And if not—if the agency is entitled to
reinterpret the statute in his (reasoned) discretion—then how,
exactly, does one agency construction avoid a nondelegation
problem?
Perhaps it does so because any agency construction makes the
basis for regulation visible to all, and in such a way as to constrain
agency choice unless and until a new interpretation has been issued
publicly and through the required channels. But this seems to be a
pale echo of the nondelegation principle. It is a pale echo, first,
because it imposes no requirements on Congress. It is a pale echo,
second, because it does not bar agencies, over time, from construing
open-ended statutory terms in radically different ways.
(c) Institutitional difficulties and very slipperly slopes
There is also a serious problem of judicial role. Judge Leventhal
used the idea as a basis for permitting a consensual arrangement
between Congress and the executive branch; the effort was to find a
222
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way to validate the statute while also giving a signal to the executive.
The notion that open-ended statutes become unconstitutional unless
accompanied by agency specification would entail a far larger judicial
role. Indeed, that role would extend far beyond the setting of
regulate of particulates and ozone. Consider the following:
•

•

•

223

It would raise serious constitutional doubts about most and
perhaps all of the rest of EPA’s national primary and secondary
standards. None of those standards was issued with a clear
statement of the criteria that would mark the line between
permitted and prohibited exposure levels.
It could well raise questions about the activities of other agencies,
such as the Federal Communications Commission, that operate
pursuant to vague statutory terms; note that the FCC is
permitted to give out licenses in accordance with “public interest,
convenience, and necessity.”223 What must the FCC say in order
to discipline the exercise of its own authority?
It would raise constitutional questions about OSHA’s use of the
“significant risk” idea. We have seen that in the Benzene Case,
the Court said that OSHA must show that any risk that it seeks
to regulate qualifies as “significant.” No one seems to think that
serious delegation issues are raised by the existence of
administrative discretion to decide when a risk so qualifies,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court plurality’s anticipation that
this judgment would be made administratively, But plainly it
would not suffice for an agency simply to announce that it deems
a certain risk to be significant. But how can a agency distinguish
between significant and insignificant risks? Lower courts and
OSHA have given some guidance, but not a great deal; under
the American Trucking ruling, this raises serious constitutional
problems.224

USC
The plurality’s answer was a mix of the procedural and the substantive. On the
procedural side, there is a duty of reason-giving; the agency must “explain in an
understandable way” why it deems a certain risk significant. Industrial Union v.
API, 448 US 607, 646 (1980). With respect to substance, the plurality made a
distinction. “If the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline
vapors that are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider
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the risk significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it.” Id. At
the same time, the plurality said that a risk of one in a billion, from drinking a
glass water, could not reasonably be considered significant.
Apart from recognizing the fact that judgments of significance will turn on
“policy considerations,” subsequent developments, in the lower courts and in
OSHA, have left a high degree of vagueness. To the extent that quantitative
judgments have been made, they take the following form. OSHA believes that a
working lifetime risk of death of over 1/1000 from occupational causes is
“significant.” Building and Constructions Trades v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1265
(DC Cir. 1988). This means that if a worker faces a 1/1000 risk of death if he is
exposed, for all of his working life, to gasoline vapors that are 2% benzene, that
worker is facing a significant risk. The agency has expressly concluded that the
significant risk standard is satisfied by a risk by 1.64 excess mesothelioma deaths
per thousand. Id. at 1265. At the same time, the agency has said that a risk of 0.6
is 100,000 “may be approaching a level that can be viewed as safe,” a qualified
statement that, in context, suggests that a risk of 6 in one million would not be
regarded as significant. Conclusions of this kind are certainly better than nothing
at all. In a metaphor, they suggest a “strike zone” within which OSHA may
operate – a domain of risk significance that marks floors and ceilings. But they
leave many open questions. What is the relevant risk involves injuries and illnesses
rather than fatalities, or some combination of injuries, illnesses, and fatalities?
Some version of the “quality-adjusted life years” idea would seem necessary to
allow meaningful comparison of, say, a risk of 1/10,000 of death alongside a risk of
1/500 of serious respiratory problems. In addition, OSHA seems to be considering
the risk for workers subject to lifetime exposure, a number that seems vulnerable
for two reasons. First, there are cases where lifetime exposure is rare; what if, say,
only 10% of the exposed population is exposed for all of a working life, and 50% is
exposed for a period of ten years or less? Shouldn’t this be taken into account in
considering the significance of the risk? Second and more fundamentally: The size
of the exposed population would seem to matter. Suppose, for example, that the
relevant risk is 1/1000, but that only 500 people are exposed to the risk; is this the
same case, in terms of significance, as one in which the relevant risk is 1/1000, and
2 million workers are exposed to the risk? Perhaps it is; perhaps the agency believes
that no one should be exposed to a 1/1000 risk of death. This is not an implausible
judgment. Even so, what if the risk is 6 in one million, but twenty million workers
are in the exposed population? By hypothesis, 120 workers will die as a result of
the hazard. Is this so clearly insignificant?
The point can be made more vividly by revisiting the Supreme Court’s
suggestion that a one/one billion risk of death from having a risk of chroninated
water “clearly could not be considered significant.” 448 US at 655 (1980). Suppose
that every American drinks five glasses of water a day; suppose too that there are
250 million Americans. If Americans drink 1.25 billion glasses of water each day,
then 1.25 Americans will contract a fatal illness each day, which is to say that 456
Americans will contract a fatal illness each year from drinking water. Is it so clear
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It would raise serious constitutional problems about statutes that
require agencies to engage in cost-benefit balancing, because
those statutes typically do not contain anything like an
accompanying theory of valuation. Two especially prominent
statutes—the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Fungicide,
Insecticide, and Pesticide Act—require the agency to regulate
“unreasonable risks,” a term that clearly contemplates some form
of cost-benefit balancing
All such statutes raise obvious questions: Should a life be valued
at $500,000 or $10 million? What about a respiratory illness?
And what is the appropriate discount rate for lives saved and
illnesses averted (say) twenty years from now?225 Congress has
made no effort to answer these questions.226 Are such measures

that the relevant risk is insignificant? That a government agency is disabled from
reaching that conclusion. A possible reaction to these problems is that it is
extremely artificial to assess the significance of a risk without also assessing the
cost of eliminating it. If the chlorinated water risk just discussed could be
eliminated at a cost of $10,000, it should by all means be eliminated; things are
different if the cost would run to many billions of dollars. But as construed by the
Court, OSHA forbids cost-benefit balancing. Hence the agency must make a riskonly determination. We can imagine a range of sensible judgments, such as,
1/1000 is presumptively significant, a presumption that could perhaps be rebutted
if the exposed population is sufficiently small; 1/100,000 is presumptively
insignificant, a presumption that could be rebutted if the exposed population is
sufficiently large; or an approach based on QALYs, one that would find, let us say,
savings of over 50 QALYs per year to be a presumptively sufficient basis for
regulation.
225
On the centrality of this question, see Heinzerling, supra note, at 2018-2025.
226
Legislative silence raises many questions. The first is positive: Why has
Congress effectively delegated the central issues to the executive branch? Part of
the answer lies in the incentives faced by individual legislators. See Aronson et al.,
supra note. For a member of Congress, an insistence on cost-benefit analysis is
likely to please relevant constituencies concerned about excessive or irrational
legislation. But a judgment about valuation – suggesting, for example, that a
statistical life is worth $2 million – is likely to be exceedingly controversial, a kind
of recipe for campaign advertisements by political opponents. In most cases,
individual members have far more to lose than to gain from specificity. But this is
only part of the explanation. In a sense, people engage in cost-benefit analysis all
the time; they decide whether to purchase a Volvo, or to have a smoke alarm, or to
live in the city, or to walk across the street at night. But ordinary people are highly
resistant to explicit cost-benefit analysis; they do not believe, for example, that
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unconstitutional unless and until the agency has come up with a
consistent method of valuation? Some observers have suggested
that cost-benefit balancing would be a way to avoid the
constitutional problems recognized in American Trucking.227 But
under the logic of the case, a cost-benefit requirement
unaccompanied by some kind of quantification would be
unconstitutional unless and until an agency disciplines itself with
clear valuation criteria. This would be an extravagant conclusion.
It would raise questions about much other EPA activity as well.
Consider the statute governing calculation of natural resource
damages, where Congress simply refers to factors that EPA must
consider, without making them exclusive or giving them a
specified weight. Is this statute therefore unconstitutional? Until
the agency has undertaken the job of weighting?

(d) Alternatives
Perhaps it would be necessary to consider a such a conclusion if
there were no alternative to the new nondelegation doctrine. But
ordinary judicial review, suitably adapted to this context, offers some
promising approaches, as we will soon see. And in the extreme cases,
the old nondelegation doctrine would be the best route to follow. In
fact International Union was the strongest case within memory for
judicial invalidation of a statute on nondelegation grounds. The
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” language offered no guidance
at all, and unlike in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, there was, in the
statute’s background, no context that could have disciplined the
discretion of the agency. If the court had sought to avoid
constitutional doubts, International Union might have been the
they are assigning a price to their child’s (statistical?) life when they decide
whether to put their child in the backseat of the car. There is a kind of moral
taboo in explicit cost-benefit analysis, at least with respect to people’s lives. The
moral taboo may be a form of irrationality; or it may be a kind of
overgeneralization of otherwise sound (or at least salutary) moral intuitions. In any
case it should not be surprising to find that law is based on those moral intuitions.
Very predictably, elected officials will sometimes require cost-benefit balancing,
but they will leave questions of valuation to bureaucrats. The second question has
to do with the legal status of such provisions.
227
See Randall Lutter and Christopher DeMuth, Ozone and the Constitution at
EPA, On the Issues (July 1999), at 3.
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occasion, not for an invitation to the agency to choose an
interpretation of its liking, for an authoritative judicial interpretation
requiring OSHA to engage in cost-benefit balancing. The court
might have so concluded on the ground that “reasonably necessary or
appropriate” is far more of a balancing provision than the more
specific toxic substance provision, and on the further ground that an
interpretation to this effect would have had the advantage of
preventing the agency from having the discretion to choose from one
of a large number of interpretations of the Act. Certainly this
approach seems preferable to a remand to the agency on
nondelegation grounds. And as we will see, judicial efforts to require
quantification—express identification of risk levels—and to elicit
relevant value judgments could accomplish most of the goals of the
new nondelegation doctrine without bringing out constitutional
artillery at all.
Indeed there is a large puzzle at the heart of American Trucking:
Why didn’t the court simply construe the Act so as to create floors
and ceilings, and then hold that the EPA’s decision was not
adequately justified, and therefore must be remanded, because of the
failure to explain why one level rather than another had been chosen?
The most plausible answer is that the Court sought not simply to
invalidate an inadequately explained regulation, but to send the
agency a stronger and more global signal, to the effect that any
regulation must be defended, on pain of constitutional invalidity, by
reference to a close, quantitative explanation of why it is superior to
the alternative. But as a constitutional doctrine, this seems
implausible. Congress frequently asks agencies to consider a set of
factors.228 Is agency action pursuant to such statutes violative of the
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See, e.g., The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 USC
753)b)!1), emphasizing that “to the maximum extent practicable,” the agency
should “rpovide for” no fewer than eight factors, including protection of public
health, economic efficiency, maintenance of exploration and production of fuels,
equitable distribution of crude oil and petroleum products, and many more. (The
statute is discussed as typical in Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard Pierce,
Administrative Law Treatise 69 (3d ed. 1994). See also, e.g., 42 USC 9622 (f)(4)
(listing seven factors as basis for presidential assessment of whether to provide a
covenant not to sue); 42 USC 9651 c (2) (providing, as guidelines for regulations
determining natural resource damages, that the President should “identify the best
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Constitution until the agency has turned the factors into something
like a rule? That would be an implausible conclusion.
B. The Place of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Administrative Law
None of this means that the nondelegation doctrine deserves no
place in administrative law. Indeed, some of the arguments thus far
suggest a far from trivial role for the doctrine.
•

Invalidations in extreme cases. In the most extreme cases, openended grants of authority should be invalidated. Schechter Poultry
was rightly decided, for the statute did not discipline executive
authority, and indeed it operated as a grant of lawmaking power
to private groups. And it would not have been at all implausible
to conclude, in International Union, that if Congress is asking a
regulatory agency to reduce occupational risks, it should say
something other than that standards should be “reasonably
necessary or appropriate” to promote statutory goals. In fact the
OSHA statute—outside of the area of toxic substances, where
Congress added relevant detail229—was a good candidate for
invalidation on nondelegation grounds.
A Supreme Court decision to this effect could have some of
the salutary effects of the Lopez230 decision in the commerce
clause area, offering a signal to Congress that it is important to
think with some particularity about the standards governing
agency behavior. There should not be many such cases; but an
occasional signal is highly desirable. It follows that if the Clean
Air Act did indeed authorize the EPA to “pick any point
between zero and a hair below . . . London’s Killer Fog,” the
court would have been right to say that it was invalid. The
problem was that this was an implausible construction of the
Act.231

available procedures . . . and shall take into consideration factors including, but not
limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem to recover”).
229
See 29 USC 655(b)(5) (referring, inter alia, to requirement that regulations
must be “feasible.”)
230
United States v. Lopez, 115 S Ct 1624 (1995).
231
See below.
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Statutory construction. In other cases, the nondelegation doctrine
is an appropriate tool of construction: As between an openended and less open-ended understanding of agency authority,
the less open-ended interpretation should be preferred. The most
famous example is Kent v. Dulles,232 where the Court narrowed a
seemingly broad grant of authority to the Secretary of State,
forbidding him from refusing a passport to a member of the
Communist Party. As we will shortly see, the nondelegation
doctrine is part of what justifies a narrowing construction of the
Clean Air Act, one that gives the agency limited room to
maneuver.
Indeed, many statutes are sensibly construed to limit agency
discretion, even if their terms are broad, for the context
reasonably suggests that the agency is not permitted to do
whatever it wishes. Consider, for example, the Amalgamated
Meat Cutters case. As I have suggested, the best approach here
would have involved a recognition that the statute was designed
to meet the perceived problem of “cost-push” inflation. So
understood, Congress hardly meant to give the President the
authority to set wages and prices however he chose. This would
be a truly bizarre reading of the statute, taken in context.233 The
President should be required to justify any wage and price freezes
in statutorily relevant terms, a requirement that should go a long
way toward alleviating the underlying concerns, which had to do
with political favoritism. This is the conventional approach to
the Federal Trade Commission Act (banning unfair trade
practices234) and (with a little more difficulty) to the Federal
Communications Act, whose key terms (“public interest,
convenience, and necessity”) are not understood to allow the
FCC to give and deny licenses on whatever terms it likes.235

357 U.S. 116 (1958)
Compare the delegation to Hitler; this was a genuine effort to allow Hitler to
rule in his discretion. See Currie, supra note.
234
See Schechter Poultry at 499.
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See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F2d 654 (DC Cir 1989);
Central Florida v. FCC, 683 F.2d (DC Cir 1982).
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Democracy-promoting minimalism: clear statement principles as
nondelegation doctrines. Perhaps most important, the
nondelegation doctrine is alive and well, but it operates under
another name: “clear statement” principles, or what we might
understand as “nondelegation canons,” occupying the
contemporary position of the old nondelegation doctrine.
Often courts say that statutes will not be interpreted to allow
agencies to engage in certain conduct unless there has been a
clear statement of authorization from Congress. For example, it
seems to be clear that agencies cannot apply statutes
extraterritorially without an express legislative decision to that
effect, and courts will not understand statutes to raise serious
constitutional questions until Congress has made clear its
intention to do so; so too, statutes are not lightly taken to
preempt state law.236 These ideas are best understood as narrower
and more targeted versions of the nondelegation doctrine. Unlike
the standard version of that doctrine, they do not say that
Congress must legislate clearly; they do not result in the
invalidation of any statute. But they do so that agencies will not
be able to move statutes in certain contested directions on their
own. Only a deliberate and specific decision from the national
legislature will suffice. By requiring Congress to legislate with
particularity on certain topics, clear statement principles serve the
same function as the nondelegation doctrine. And they do so
with respect to subjects that particularly seem to call for
legislative rather than executive judgments.
There is a further point. The nondelegation canons require
congressional lawmaking, and in that sense they are connected
with Article I goals, but they pose far less serious risks that the
old doctrine. Where the old doctrine runs into serious
institutional problems, partly because of the difficulty of drawing
principled lines between too much and too little delegation, the
nondelegation canons are quite simple to apply. Because of they
do not require courts to decide hard questions of degree, and

See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, 499 US 244 (1991) (extraterritoriality);
Muscagee Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439 (DC Cir 1988) (construction in favor
of Native Americans); William Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Construction (citing
numerous canons).
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apply in a restricted domain, they impose far less strain on the
judicial role. And where the old doctrine might be criticized as a
potential source of danger to the fabric of national institutions,
the nondelegation canons pose no such risk. They do not require
general clarity from Congress; they mean only that where
sensitive rights or interests are involved, Congress, rather than
agencies, must make the central choices.
It is especially striking that these “little” nondelegation
principles trump agency interpretations of law, even in the postChevron era, which grants agencies a high degree of lawinterpreting power.237 Agency interpretations of ambiguous
provisions do not prevail in the face of a clear statement
principle, whose point is to ensure congressional rather than
merely executive deliberation on the question at hand. Thus
understood, the clear statement principles are a paradigmatic
form of “democracy-promoting minimalism.” They reflect a
cautious judicial role, one that does not preempt democratic
processes but instead attempts to fortify them, by ensuring that
certain sensitive questions receive explicit and sustained attention
from the national legislature.

C. Why the Clean Air Act is Constitutional (and What It Means)
All this helps identify the basic question that must be answered
in order to decide whether the Clean Air Act is constitutional: Does
the Act authorize the EPA to set standards at whatever level it
wishes? Or does it set ceilings and floors?
In answering this question, courts appropriately do whatever
might reasonably be done to avoid invalidating the Act—a natural
application of the general idea that whenever possible, statutes
should be construed so as to be constitutional.238 The central issue is
237

See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Cor. V. Florida Gulf Copast, 485 US 568, 575
(1988); Miller v. Johnson, 515 US 900, 923 (1995) (refusing to defer to agency
interpretation because of constitutional doubts); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d
657, 661 (9th Cir 1997); Boston and Maine Corp. v. ICC, 911 F.2d 743 (DC Cir.
1990).
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See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958). For a similar sentiment for an
enthusiast for the nondelegation, see Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First
Principles, 36 Am Univ L Rev 345, 352 (1987): “[T]he nondelegation doctrine

Chicago Working Paper in Public Law and Legal Theory 62
therefore one of statutory construction. In fact it is entirely possible
to generate an interpretation of the statute that survives
constitutional scrutiny. The most reasonable interpretation is that
EPA’s health-based judgment (a) cannot call for regulation of small
or trivial risks (such regulation would not be “requisite to protect the
public health”), and (b) must call for regulation of risks that are
serious and substantial. Thus if the residual risk of a pollutant is
trivial or de minimis—if, for example, the risk involves minor
respiratory problems but no more than that—then EPA is not
obligated to regulate it. Indeed, EPA regulation of a trivial or de
minimis risk should be held unlawful, on the ground that such
regulation is not requisite to protect the public health, even with an
adequate margin of safety. If EPA seeks to reduce exposure to
ground-level ozone below a level that already ensures protection
against all serious risks faced by substantial numbers of persons, it is
acting unlawfully.239 On the other hand, EPA is required (not merely
permitted) to regulate any substantial or significant risk. If, for
example, 10,000 people are likely to die each year as a result of
exposure to a certain level of lead, EPA must act; it is not authorized
to allow that level of risk.
These points go a long way toward creating floors and ceilings
and resolving the polar cases. Suppose, for example, that existing
evidence shows increased mortality risks from sulfur dioxide at levels
above .8 ppm, and increased hospital admissions at levels about .6
ppm, but no mortality risk from sulfur dioxide levels below .4 ppm,
and no increase in hospital admissions below .4 ppm—and also that
there is chronic plant injury at .1 ppm, and that respiratory problems
increase among a small, sensitive subpopulation at .15 ppm. On the
facts as stated, EPA’s discretion is confined. It could not issue a
primary standard above .6 ppm or so, and it could not issue a
standard below .5 ppm or so—unless it could make extrapolations
from the evidence that would suggest a substantial risk at lower
levels. Of course this is a stylized and artificial example, and often
should be applied only as a second, perhaps last resort. Initial consideration should
be given to reading the statutory authority of the agencies and the President more
narrowly if the language permits.”
239
Indeed there is a reasonable argument that this was the case for the ozone
regulation at issue in American Trucking. See supra.
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the evidence will allow a range of reasonable judgments. But that is a
product of the uncertain science, not of any constitutional defect in
the statute. Indeed, EPA itself has asserts that on the evidence, it
was required to set the ozone standard somewhere between .07 ppm
and .09 ppm—a statement that, if true, is decisive on the
nondelegation question.
The approach I am suggesting—one that would understand the
Act to create ceilings and floors—raises several questions of its own.
It might be asked how the Act supports a distinction between trivial
and significant risks; isn’t this an invention of interpretation, rather
than a legitimate reading of the Act? To be sure, the Act does not
explicitly make such a distinction, but an interpretation to this effect
is far from unnatural and indeed a good deal more compelling than
the plurality’s similar interpretation of OSHA in the Benzene
case,240 Surely such an interpretation should be favored if it is
necessary to prevent the Act from being a blank check to EPA.
It might also be stressed that this interpretation continues to
allow EPA a large deal of discretion; for reasons stated by the
American Trucking court, isn’t the statute unconstitutional even as
construed, at least unless and until the EPA can give more specificity
to notions like “substantial” and “trivial”? The answer is that the
court was quite wrong on this point. The most important precedent
here is the Benzene Case itself. The OSHA statute, as construed by
the Supreme Court, requires the agency to regulate “significant” risks
to the point of “feasibility,” and neither term is defined in the
statute. This does not mean that the statute is unconstitutional until
OSHA particularizes those terms. What it does mean is that any
agency decision is subject to invalidation on grounds of arbitrariness
240

The basic problem for the plurality is that there was no statutory source for the
“significant risk” requirement in the OSHA Act. This was a judicial invention,
designed to make sense rather than nonsense of the law. See 448 US at 607. By
contrasting, the Clean Air Act’s requirement of standards that are “requisite to
protect the public health” and based on the underlying scientific “criteria
document” is quite naturally taken to require the agency not to permit serious
risks, while requiring the agency not to regulate small risks. Of course the
American Trucking court’s concern was “how serious is serious?”—a legitimate
question, but one best handled via conventional judicial review, as explained
below.
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if the agency has not adequately explained itself. The upshot: this,
not delegation, was the fundamental problem in American Trucking.
My basic conclusion is that the nondelegation doctrine should
be used in the most extreme cases; that the Clean Air Act is not such
a case; that the doctrine properly plays a role as a tool of statutory
construction, emphatically with the Clean Air Act; and that the
work done by the court under the rubric of the nondelegation
doctrine is more reasonably done under review of agency action for
arbitrariness. It is now time to turn to the questions that
remain—questions that are not constitutional in status, but that are
extremely important nonetheless.
VIII. Options, Futures, and Clean Air
[A]n agency wielding the power over American life possessed by EPA
should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit of
harm that takes into account population affected, severity and
probability.
American Trucking Association v. EPA241
At the rate of progress permitted by . . . judicial decisions, the EPA and
OSHA could not possibly perform their statutorily assigned missions
through use of rulemaking in less than several centuries.
Richard Pierce242

A. EPA on Remand: Ceilings, Floors, and “Benefits Analysis”
1. The problem
I have emphasized that notwithstanding its commendable detail
about the underlying evidence, the EPA’s explanation of its rule
leaves much to be desired. This is not uncommon for agency
explanations in the area of safety and health; similar problems can be
found in the OSHA context and also in EPA action under other
statutes.243 The agency’s extensive discussion is abstract and
241

American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir. 1999).
Richard Pierce, Seven Ways to De-Ossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Ad L. Rev.
59 (1995).
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See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 847 F2d 1201 (1991), where the court
rightly found a number of unanswered objections to an agency rule banning
asbestos—a rule that would probably have produced far more gain than harm on
balance. (No one contradicted the agency’s conclusion that the rule would have
242
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conclusory on the key points. It does provide evidence that ozone
and particulates can have adverse effects at current levels. But it does
not give a sufficiently clear sense of the level of those adverse effects,
nor does it explain why the particular, selected regulation was
optimally suited to new information about health effects. The most
informative document is the agency’s regulatory impact analysis,
which could be used as the basis for a simple statement of the
anticipated benefits of increased regulation at various levels.
The resulting problems have both technocratic and democratic
dimensions. Without specification of the range of benefits to be
anticipated from various approaches, there is a weak role for sound
science in standard-setting. The best that science can do it to give a
range of likely health and welfare gains from alternative initiatives,
and the proper role of technocratic factors cannot be served if the
EPA speaks in vague, conclusory, or wholly qualitative terms. What
is necessary is to have some sense of the magnitude of gains from
competing approaches. From the democratic point of view, what is
missing is an opportunity for the public, first, to have a sense of
those gains, and second, to be able to receive an account of why the
government has chosen one set of gains rather than another. Any
particular choice reflects an important social judgment; officials
should be clear about the values that underlie that choice.
2. Toward benefits analysis
By way of response, I suggest that in issuing national ambient
air quality standards, EPA should endeavor to provide a detailed
“benefits analysis,” designed to strengthen both technocratic and
democratic forces. In order to improve the role of science, the
benefits analysis should attempt to describe, in both qualitative and
quantitative terms, the various savings from the selected regulation
and at least two alternatives, one more stringent, the other less so.
This is an effort to strengthen the role of technocratic forces by
saved well over 300 lives per year at a reasonable overall cost.) The court’s decision
eliminated the asbestos regulation, a ten-year effort, and seems in the process to
have brought EPA’s rulemaking efforts under the Toxic Substances Control Act
to a complete halt. Cf. Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, supra note (finding
similar systemic effects of judicial review). A possible answer to this problem
would have been for the court to remand without vacating the rule.
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ensuring that EPA is acting pursuant to a clear understanding of the
health and welfare effects of reasonable options, In the process EPA
should identify the residual risk left, under alternative approaches, by
the pollutant in question and explain why that residual risk is not
above the level “requisite the protect the public health.” The EPA
should thus take steps to identify the size of the population affected,
the severity of the various risks, and the likelihood that members of
any particular group will suffer the relevant effects. To the extent
possible, it should attempt to quantify each of these items.244 It
might say, for example, that forty million people are at risk, that ten
million of these people are under the age of eighteen, that five
million are over the age of sixty, that there is a 1/1000 chance of
cancer as a result of exposure, and that the relevant risks range from
respiratory problems to hospitalization and missed work-days to
cancer (each of which might be quantified; see Table 2).
The EPA should also explain why one set of savings, thus
quantified, justifies regulation, whereas other sets of savings do not.
Here there is an inevitable judgment of value, and no purely
technocratic exercise. EPA might conclude, for example, that one
approach leaves an excessive risk to health, because it would result in
between 500 and 1500 annual deaths as compared with the chosen
approach—whereas another initiative would go beyond the level
required to protect the public health, because it would result in
between 0 and 150 annual deaths, most of them involving the
elderly. This is an effort to strengthen democratic forces in
regulation, by ensuring that the relevant value judgment is made
publicly and exposed to democratic view.
EPA should also attempt to reduce its own discretion by
showing that at least as a presumption, risks above a certain level will
not be tolerated (“risk ceilings”) and that risks below a certain level
(“risk floors”) will be acceptable. It should, in short, explain why a
244

An argument against quantification is provided in Heinzerling, supra note, at
2042-2069. Even if we accept Heinzerling’s argument against the form of
monetizing quantification that is embodied in cost-benefit analysis, it is far from
clear that the argument has weight against an attempt quantify (rather than to
monetize) benefits. For an argument in favor of both qualitative and quantitative
presentations, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, J. Legal
Stud. (forthcoming 2000).
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standard for ozone of 0.08 is to be preferred to a standard of 0.09 or
0.07, and do so by reference to generalizable criteria. If—as seems
clear—the risks prevented by the new ozone regulation are far
smaller than the risks that would be prevented by more stringent
regulation of particulates, EPA should explain the apparent anomaly
in terms of statutorily relevant factors. A chief advantage of this
approach is that it should ensure inter-regulation consistency, in
such a way as to combat, simultaneously, interest-group power,
public torpor, and public over-reaction with respect to certain
pollutants. I return to this point shortly.
3. Difficulties, uncertainty, contentious assumptions
A proposal of this kind raises several problems. An obvious
difficulty is connected with specifying the set of alternatives. Any
agency could “frame” the alternatives so as to make its own choice
seem plausible, even inevitable. In the context of ozone, for example,
the choice of .08 would have seemed entirely reasonable if EPA had
compared that option to .12 (much worse on health grounds) and
.04 (regulating apparently trivial risks). Thus it is necessary to ensure
that the alternatives be reasonable ones—that they be within the
domain, or “strike zone,” indicated by the scientific evidence. The
CASAC recommendations provide a great deal of help here. They
specify the range of options that experts consider plausible, and if
EPA compares its choice to both more and less stringent alternatives
within the approximate domain suggested by CASAC, the problem
of “framing” should be adequately addressed.
Of course any analysis of expected benefits will depend on
contentious assumptions. The most serious problem here is that in
many cases, scientific uncertainty will confound any attempt to
quantify with anything like precision. In these circumstances EPA’s
real question is one of timing: Does it act now, or does it wait until
the scientific information provides more clarity with respect to
health effects? Inaction would create potential problems, possibly
even a significant number of preventable deaths; but action could
create problems too, in the form of high costs for trivial health
benefits. This is certainly a plausible reading of the situation with
respect to both particulates and (especially) ozone; in both cases we
do not know enough to assign specific numbers to different exposure
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levels. When existing evidence does not justify any particular
number, then EPA should do the best that it can to specify a
reasonable range. (See Appendix for examples, taken from the RIA.)
But scientific uncertainty is not the only problem. A projection of
benefits must depend on a baseline about what would have happened
without regulation, and might also require use of the contingent
valuation method, for which estimates are highly vulnerable to the
nature of the particular questions asked.245 Perhaps most important,
the estimate of benefits will turn partly on the discount rate for
future savings; a discount rate of 8% will produce very different
numbers from a discount rate of 2%.246 In these circumstances, the
benefits analysis should be clear about the assumptions chosen, and
should indicate the range of benefits and the numbers that would
emerge from different assumptions.
In terms of intergovernmental design, it makes sense to ensure
that the analysis of the rule, and the alternatives to the rule, are
developed in conjunction with another institution in the executive
branch, such as the Office of Management and Budget, which
already plays a role of this sort under Executive Order 12866.247 The
purpose of intergovernmental review of this kind would be to ensure
a form of internal “peer review,” designed to overcome possible
biases and errors on the part of any particular bureaucracy. An
external check is well-suited to accomplishing this goal.
4. An analogy: from health to the environment
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See Lutter, supra, at 6-10.
See Heinzerling, supra note.
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3 CFR 638 (1993).
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A promising approach to the evaluation of benefits comes from
the health field, where much attention has focused on evaluating
preferences for healthy conditions (or aversion to unhealthy ones) in
terms of what are called quality-adjusted life years (“QALYs”).248 A
QALY is a measure of health based on people's attitudes toward
various conditions. It rejects the concept of monetary evaluation of
health; instead, it focuses on how people value various health states.
It seeks to generate a means of comparing various states of health
through a single metric, so that comparisons and trade-offs can be
made for public policy purposes. The measure attempts to take into
account both quantitative benefits of health improvement, such as
increase in life expectancy, and more qualitative improvements, such
as quality-of-life benefits.
The QALY approach works by asking people through interview
techniques to express their strength of preference for various health
states. The most advanced methods disaggregate the process by
asking people to describe how they would value a health
improvement along several dimensions: mobility, physical activity,
social activity, and the kinds of symptom effects involved.249 The
answers to these questions are combined into a single scale, ranked
0.0 (for death) to 1.0 (for optimum functioning). The result is an
index of utility for health states measured on an interval (or cardinal)
scale. By independently determining the cost of various treatments
and their likely outcomes, reseachers can suggest a cost per QALY of
various public programs. Alternative programs can be ranked in what
is essentially a utility-based cost-effectiveness scale.250
248

The measure was first described in Richard Zeckhauser and Donald Shepard,
Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 L & Contemp Probs 5 (1976).
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An important work in the development of these multidimensional measures is
Robert M. Kaplan and James W. Bush, Health-Related Quality for Life
Measurement of Evaluation Research and Policy Analysis, 1 Health Psych 61
(1982). For a general survey of QALY approaches, see George W. Torrance,
Measurement of Health State Utilities for Economic Appraisal: A Review, 5 J
Health Econ 1 (1986). For a more recent general discussion, see Valuing Health
for Policy at 118-36.
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An important advantage of the QALY method is that it eliminates the
distribution-of-income problems of other methods. The QALY approach rests on
a strict egalitarian premise; the value of various states of health should be
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In the context of the Clean Air Act, it makes little sense to
engage in surveys about how people rank various health risks. In the
governing RIA, EPA has already attempted to measure willingness
to pay to reduce various risks (see Table IV, Appendix), and it could
easily adapt these figures to generate numbers for overall risk
reductions, defined in terms of quality-adjusted life years. Lives
saved might, for example, be converted into a life-years saved
number, and to this EPA could add various numbers representing
the other health gains to be brought about by the regulation. The
approach to particulates might be compared to, and squared with,
the approach to ozone, and these approaches might also be
rationalized with existing regulation of lead, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, and carbon monoxide (see Appendix).
5. Toward a (new) common law of regulatory protection
Through such a route EPA could begin to develop what it
should have provided at least a decade ago: a common law of public
health protection. This would reflect a system of judgments
indicating when a given set of harms are sufficient to trigger
additional regulation, and also when a set of harms is too trivial to
count as a legally cognizable public health problem. And eventually
it should be possible to have quite disaggregated data, showing the
geographical areas in which health problems are most concentrated.
For example, the health risks of lead were concentrated in the inner
city251; the same may well be true of particulates. If this is so, a
careful “benefits analysis” could pave the way toward an
understanding of where regulatory activity would accomplish the
most good, in a way that would diminish some of the problems
associated with a nationally uniform policy. Such an approach could
also help to invigorate local processes for environmental protection,

independent of the economic status of the particular people in those states.
Willingness to pay and contingent valuation treat health like any other market
commodity, while QALY approaches view health as a distinct good that should be
distributed according to a nonmarket logic. Costs are still relevant, of course, but
they are not brought in at the level of individual decisions.
251
See Melnick, supra note, at 112-120.
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so as to allow a higher degree of coordination between the national
government and states and localities.252
This final point raises a general question about the content of
any such common law: the status, for purposes of law and policy, of
inter-regulation inconsistency. Suppose, for example, that the EPA
leaves a much higher residual risk for particulates than for ozone, as
indeed it plainly appears to have done here.253 Is this indefensible, or
even unlawful? As we have seen, one of the virtues of the approach
suggested here is that it attempts to promote consistency in the
rulemaking process, in such a way as to reduce the power of wellorganized private groups. It might seem to follow that if EPA allows
a much higher residual risk for one substance than for another, it
should be vulnerable on judicial review; and so too if it allows a
much lower residual risk for a particular pollutant. This does indeed
follow. The question is whether EPA can defend apparent interregulation inconsistency in statutorily relevant terms (as, for
example, by showing that children are at particular risk from one or
another problem). If it cannot, it has acted unlawfully.
There is a still broader point in the background here. The case
for clear standards is strongest in a “mass justice” situation—a
context in which an agency must decide a wide range of cases. In
such situations, standardlessness is unacceptable, a recipe for abuse,
for the unequal treatment of the similarly situated.254 When an
agency is making a one-shot decision, or two or three decisions, the
argument for binding standards is less insistent. The point helps
explain the decision of the court of appeals in American Trucking,
where two regulations were before the court, not easily reconciled
with one another, and where many years of NAAQS decisions make
the situation resemble more closely a “mass justice” problem. In
these circumstances, the proposal for “benefits analysis” is designed
to ensure a set of relatively uniform and transparent standards, more
suitable to the future of environmental protection, where the whole
area will achieve a degree of maturity. The development of a
252

See Charles Sabel et al., After Backyard Environmentalism, Boston Review
(forthcoming 1999).
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See Appendix.
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See Jerry Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (1983).
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common law of regulatory protection, generated in the first instance
by agencies rather than judges, would be a crucial step in this
endeavor.
B. Ordinary (Not Extraordinary) Judicial Review: DemocracyPromoting Minimalism in Practice
As I have suggested, conventional judicial review could have
accommodated the American Trucking court’s reasonable concerns. In
order to explore how democracy-promoting minimalism might
work, I suggest here that the appropriate approach would be to hold
both regulations invalid on the ground that the agency did not
adequately explain its choice of the particular levels that it
prescribed. The most serious problem with this approach is that it
threatens excessive judicial entanglement with the rulemaking
process, in a way that would likely have unfortunate systemic effects,
in the form of a powerful bias toward protecting the status quo. The
best response to this concern is to choose one of the two recent
innovations in judicial review of administrative action: allowing the
agency to issue an interim rule, or (better still) remanding the
regulations without vacating them.
1. Failing the hard look
A quite standard opinion would have invalidated the agency’s
rules on the ground that there was an insufficiently clear explanation
of the key policy decisions. On this view, the problem was not one of
delegation, but of a lack of clarity about why lines were drawn
exactly where the EPA drew them. Why did the EPA choose 0.08
ppm rather than 0.07 ppm, or 0.06 PPM? The difficulty of
answering that question in concrete terms would have justified a
remand to the agency.
This approach might be generalized. It could apply, for
example, to a judgment of OSHA that a regulation is necessary to
address a “significant risk,” or to an administrative decision to
proceed against an “unreasonable risk.” In such cases, courts might
require agencies to quantify the problem that they are attempting to
reduce, and explain why they chose the approach at issue rather than
one more or less stringent. A simple requirement of this kind might
strengthen the hand of technocratic and policy-analytic forces in the
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regulatory state, thus weakening the hand of self-interested private
groups, and also promote transparency about the relevant value
judgments.
2. Surviving a softer look
A conventional opinion, more deferential to the agency and also
reasonable, might have upheld both the ozone and the PM
standards, on the ground that neither had been shown to be arbitrary
or capricious, because the agency sufficiently explained why the risk
was less severe below the standard it set, and also why the risk was
too severe at any point above that standard. The agency did show
that significant risks could be expected, especially from particulates,
where thousands of people, on a reasonable view of the evidence,
were at risk each year. To be sure, significant challenges were made
to the science underlying both decisions. But the record contained
substantial support for the EPA’s particular choices—at least enough
support to satisfy a court engaged in the ordinary scrutiny of EPA
decisions. This approach might also be generalized. For example, a
court might uphold OSHA action so long as the agency has
explained why a particular risk is significant and explained, at least in
broad terms, why it did not select a more or less stringent alternative.
3. The problem of ossification and the tyranny of the status quo revisited
Both of these opinions would have been entirely responsible,
and the choice between them, both for the case at hand and for
future approaches to judicial review, is very close. If the second is to
be preferred, it is not because the EPA was necessarily doing its job
well, but for reasons that go to institutional competence and that
involve the harmful systemic effects of the seemingly innocuous,
one-shot remand.
With respect to institutional competence: The EPA is of course
accountable to the President, and environmental issues tend to be
highly visible and well-ventillated publicly—as well ventillated,
perhaps, as any other issue of regulatory policy. Certainly the PM
and ozone rules were subject to high degree of public scrutiny. At
the same time, these are technically complex questions on which
EPA has a strong comparative advantage over the judiciary. If there
is a clear blunder, or a judgment that does not depend on a
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reasonable assessment of the scientific evidence or (where the
evidence leaves gaps) a reasonable and articulated judgment of value,
of course the court should interfere. But otherwise it should not.
With respect to systematic effects: A great deal of attention had
been paid to the phenomenon of the “ossification” of notice-andcomment rulemaking,255 and indeed a high priority, for the future of
administrative law, is to devise means to overcome the problem.
Originally intended as a quick and effective alternative to formal, onthe-record rulemaking, executive and especially judicial innovations
have converted notice-and-comment rulemaking into an
exceptionally time-consuming affair, often consuming many years,
frequently half a decade and more. In fact the EPA estimates that
informal rulemaking typically takes five years.256 Consider, for
example, the fact that the EPA’s only rulemaking under the Toxic
Substances Act, involving asbestos, cost millions of dollars and over
a decade—and that the rule that emerged was eventually struck
down as inadequately justified.257 Aggressive judicial review
contributes to these delays, and when the result is to remand a rule,
the ultimate consequence can be to discourage rulemaking
altogether. The impressive study of Mashaw and Harfst shows that
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has come close
to abandoning rulemaking, largely because of the problems
introduced by “hard look” judicial review.258 Instead of rulemaking,
NHTSA acts largely by after-the-fact recalls, to which courts are far
more sympathetic. It is far from clear that American drivers are
better off with this shift. Nor is this an isolated example. Something
similar appears to have happened with the Consumer Safety
Administration, and the EPA seems to have abandoned enforcement
of the Toxic Substances Control Act, largely as a result of intense
judicial scrutiny of EPA activity.259
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Now we cannot conclude that a certain judicial role is
inappropriate simply because it leads to agency inactivity. Perhaps it
is good for exactly that reason. The problem is when strict judicial
supervision has the effect of freezing the status quo, whatever the
status quo happens to be. This is an unintended systemic effect of
hard look review. Particular judges, reviewing particular rules, can be
made alert to particular problems in those rules, especially when the
rules are under attack by experienced, inventive lawyers. For some
rules, it is easy to imagine seemingly decisive objections from both
sides—as public interest lawyers show, quite convincingly, why a
certain rule should have been made more stringent, and as industry
lawyers show, with respect to the same rule, why greater leniency
was legally mandated. Nor is this fanciful; something of this kind has
happened on several occasions in the “hard look” era.
There is no simple cure for the problem, especially in light of
evidence that hard look review has often accomplished considerable
good. But it makes sense to say that in thez absence of a violation of
statute, courts should not invalidate regulations unless the objection
goes to the heart of the agency’s conclusions—unless there has been
a quite serious error of analysis, or there is good reason to think that
the rule will make things worse rather than better in light of
statutorily relevant criteria. Of course advice of this sort will not
decide concrete questions. But it suggests serious problems with
invalidation of the EPA’s ozone and particulates regulations.
4. Procedural innovations: administrative law minimalism
Thus far a court might seem to be in equipoise between two
reasonable alternatives: a decision to uphold the regulations on the
grounds just stated, and a decision to invalidate them on the theory
that the agency offered no clear explanation of the particular level it
chose. The choice between the alternatives might turn on assessment
of the systemic effects of one or another course. The danger of
invalidation is that it could greatly delay this or any other EPA
rulemaking, in a way that would cause a powerful status quo bias,
one that could not be defended. The danger of validation is that it
would allow EPA rules that have not been persuasively defended and
that might do less good than harm.
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But two recent procedural innovations help resolve the
dilemma, and point the way to a sensible resolution of the case.
Courts of appeals now appear prepared to allow agencies to issue
“interim rules” on remand,260 so as to ensure against the harm that
may come from returning to the pre-rule status quo; and courts are
also prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to remand rules without
vacating them.261 The “interim rules” approach makes best sense
when the agency can show that without such rules, people will face
serious risks of one kind or another; the “remand without vacating”
approach makes best sense when it can also be shown that the
agency may well be able to justify its action on remand. Both of
these ideas are designed to ensure that rules that are highly likely to
be reasonable are not struck from the books, in a way that could
produce considerable harm. Properly understood, they do not allow
agencies to proceed with inadequately justified rules if it appears
unlikely that those rules could be lawfully explained, or if it appears
that little will be lost with invalidation.
Hence we arrive at an appropriate approach to these cases, one
with general application: The rules should be held unlawful, and
remanded to the agency; but they should not be vacated, at least
when the agency can show (a) that it may be able to generate a
justification that will satisfy judicial review and (b) that invalidation
of the rule may generate significant risks (by, for example, allowing
people to be exposed to nontrivial dangers, or by preventing the
agency from initiating a program for reducing such risks).262 After
260

See Chemical Manufacturers v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259 (DC Cir 1994); Checkosky
v. FCC, 23 F.3d 452 (DC Cir 1994); Mid-Tex Electric Cooperative v. FERC,
822 F.2d 1123 (DC Cir 1987); Pierce, supra note.
261
Id.; Idaho Farm v. Babbitt, 58 F,3d 1392 (9th Cir 1995); AMA v. Reno, 57
F.3d 1129 (DC Cir 1995); Davis County v. EPA< 108 F.3d 1454 (DC Cir 1997);
Allied Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146 (DC Cir 1993) (announcing that court
will not vacate rules because of inadequacy in agency reasoning if agency has a
serious possibility of correcting the deficiency on remand and vacation may be
disruptive);
262
Some support for the agency’s choices, to be sure not decisive, comes from the
fact that California made quite similar decisions not less than a decade ago. See
James Lents, A Review of National Ozone and Particulate Matter Air Quality
Standards In Light of Long-Standing California Air Quality Standards, 11 Tul.
Envt. L. J. 415 (1998).
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the agency attempts to justify its regulation on remand, its decision
may be appealed to the court, which can evaluate the new
justification and uphold or invalidate the regulation as appropriate.
An approach of this kind seems especially sensible for the
particulates regulation, which is designed to counteract what, on a
reasonable reading of the evidence, count as quite serious risks to life
and health. The problem with invalidation is that it would require
the agency to start largely from scratch, a process that may require
years or more of rulemaking activity. A remand without invalidation
would allow the agency to proceed if (as appears quite possible) the
regulation can be adequately defended by reference to the criteria I
have outlined. Things are more difficult for ozone, because the risks
are far lower, and for a reason to be suggested shortly; but here as
well, a remand without invalidation would probably be the best way
to proceed.
There is a broader point in the background here. The
techniques of remand without invalidation, and of allowing interim
rules, can be seen as a form of administrative law “minimalism,” akin
to judicial minimalism in constitutional law generally.263 Such
techniques do no more than is necessary to resolve a case. Indeed,
these forms of minimalism are democracy-reinforcing insofar as they
attempt to ensure that agency decisions are based on grounds that
are both transparent to the public and sufficient to justify the
regulation in light of statutory criteria.
5. A health-health wrinkle
A difficult question, not addressed thus far, is raised by a
particular claim with respect to EPA’s ozone regulation: that
ground-level ozone has health benefits, and that these benefits were
not taken into account by the agency. There is evidence that ozone
reduces the risk of both cataracts and cancers.264 If taken into
account, the health benefits of ozone may well be roughly equivalent
to the health costs of ozone. But the EPA refused to consider those

263
264

See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999).
See Randall Lutter, supra note.
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health benefits. In an interesting application of “health-health”
analysis, the court of appeals held that the refusal was unlawful.265
In general, it is right to say that agencies should be required to
take account of the health problems sometimes produced by
regulation designed to reduce health problems. This kind of healthhealth tradeoff can take many different forms.266 In typical cases, the
regulation of one risk, like those associated with asbestos, may give
rise to further risks as a result of the substituted products. The most
adventurous claims for “health-health” comparisons arise when a
costly regulation imposes health risks simply by virtue of its cost.267 If
a regulation produces less employment and more poverty, it may
result in worse health as well. But these are adventurous claims,
because they depend on contentious projections about the
disemployment effects of particular regulations.
For the ozone rule, the argument for taking those problems into
account seemed especially insistent, for the claim was far from
indirect, and there was nothing speculative or abstruse about the
causal chain. If ozone protects against cancers and cataracts, it is
possible that a regulation of ozone will cause serious health
problems. The text of the Act is quite ambiguous on the point, and
the court was wrong to say that it unambiguously required the
agency to address the beneficial effects of some pollutants.268 But the
court was right to hold that even if it was ambiguous, the agency
interpretation was unreasonable. The rule was properly found
inadequately explained on this ground, and it may well be that after
remand, the agency will be unable to explain its failure to take
account of the effects of ozone in combating cataracts and cancer.
C. Congress: Safety and its Cost
Should Congress amend the national ambient air quality
provisions of the Clean Air Act? This is not the place for an
265

175 F.3d at 1027.
See John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1997); Cass R.
Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, in Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social
Justice (1997).
267
See id.
268
See 175 F.2d at 1027.
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extended discussion of that question; but the analysis thus far
suggests three possibilities.
1. How safe is safe enough?
As emphasized throughout, a crucial defect of the national
ambient air quality provisions is that they seem to assume that
whether air is “safe” can be assessed solely on the basis of the facts.
The truth is that the facts might be able to show the degree of risk
(at least within a range), but they cannot show whether any
particular degree of safety is “safe enough.” Whether pollutants lack
safe thresholds, “the paradigm of selecting a standard at the lowestobservable-effects-level and then providing an ‘adequate margin of
safety’ is not possible.”269 The result of the statutory framework is to
misframe the key question and also to give EPA little guidance for
answering and asking that question. As we have seen, EPA has
greatly struggled with the resulting difficulties.
Congress should amend the statute to identify the factors for
EPA to consider in making the judgment about appropriate national
standards. Congress might offer substantive guidance by saying, for
example, that the EPA must consider risk severity, size of affected
population, and likelihood of adverse effects at various exposure
levels. On the procedural side, it might require EPA to identify, to
the extent possible, the nature of the risks that it is reducing, and at
the same time to attempt to quantify the relevant risk reductions.
The strongest argument against an amendment to this effect is that
it is unnecessary; if the EPA moved in the directions suggested
above, it would essentially be interpreting the current statute as if it
contained instructions of exactly this sort. But an amendment of this
kind would at least provide a clear legislative signal, and move EPA
judgments in the direction of greater transparency.
2. More flexible tools
We now know that significant cost savings can be achieved by
using more flexible, market-oriented instruments.270 Sometimes,
269

See note supra.
See generally National Academy of Public Administration, The Environmental
Goes to Market (1994).
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however, the EPA does not choose such instruments even when it is
legally authorized to do so.271 It would make sense to amend the
statute should require the EPA, wherever feasible, to use economic
incentives rather than a “command-and-control” approach.272
It is clear that an approach of this kind could save substantial
resources, and if the instruments are properly chosen, it should do so
without at the same time compromising air quality goals.273 An effort
to encourage the EPA to select less burdensome alternatives could
send a desirable signal to attempt the least-cost methods of
obtaining regulatory goals, and might in addition spur creative
experimentation.
3. Costs and benefits
A possible lesson of EPA experience with national standards is
that EPA should be required or at least permitted to consider costs
when setting such standards. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that the
statute should be construed to forbid cost-benefit analysis from
EPA,274 though lower courts have unanimously concluded
otherwise.275 If the Supreme Court does not reject the lower court’s
view, it is worth giving serious consideration to a statutory change.
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See Gray, supra note.
Cf. Statement of Jonathan Wiener Before the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, March 8, 1995 (urging general amendment to allow agencies to choose
incentive-based regulation).
273
See Robert Hahn and Gordon Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory
and Practice, 16 Ecology LQ 361 (1989).
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After Chevron v. NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984), ambiguities in statute are to be
resolved by the agency, and there is a good argument that the key provision of the
Act is ambiguous. Recall that the statute requires standards to be set at a level
“requisite to protect the public health,” and it is not unreasonable to say that that
level is at least partly a function of the costs of the regulation. What level is
“requisite” may well depend on the costs as well of benefits of getting there.
Ironically, however, the view that the agency can choose, or fail to choose, costbenefit analysis seems to aggravate rather than to diminish the old nondelegation
doctrine, even though an agency choice of that kind would seem to satisfy the new
nondelegation doctrine. See Industrial Union, supra (concluding that the
nondelegation problem would be eliminated if OSHA chose cost-benefit analysis).
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See note supra.
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The basic reasoning here is straightforward. If a reduction from
0.8 to 0.7 would be a trivial expense, surely it should be required; if it
would cost trillions of dollars, there had better be good grounds to
believe in very substantial health benefits. A possible argument to
the contrary is that national standards operate as aspirations, not
ordinary law, and aspirations, at least, should be set on a health-only
basis—not because there is a magic place where air quality is “safe,”
but because it is valuable to obtain, and use, a technocratic judgment
that people should have air quality of a certain specified sort.276 The
problem is that it is impossible to assess “safety” in a cost-vacuum.
A better argument against an amendment to require costbenefit analysis is that the statute, complex as it is, actually embodies
a better accommodation of costs and benefits than would a statute
that required cost-benefit analysis at the level of standard-setting.277
On this view, the optimal system is one in which EPA makes an
initial, purely health-based judgment, and then the process of
implementation allows costs to play a role at various stages,
emphatically including an expectation that implementation will not
be immediate and will in fact be a product of a continuing inquiry
into whether compliance is worthwhile, all things considered.278 A
possible virtue of this state of affairs is precisely the aspirational
quality of the health-based standard, setting a target against which
various state performances can be measured. The aspirational quality
can also contribute to technology-forcing, an important and often
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See the quotation from Administrator Browner, supra. Administrator Browner
goes on to say: “While cost-benefit analysis is a tool that can be helpful in
developing strategies to implement or nation’s air quality standards, we believe it is
inappropriate for use to set the standards themselves. In many cases, cost-benefit
analysis has overstated costs. In addition, many kinds of benefits are virtually
impossible to quantify—how do I put a dollar value on reductions in a child’s lung
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infection?” Ironically, the Regulatory Impact Analysis required by President
Clinton engages in monetization of just this kind. See Appendix.
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This seems to be the conclusion of William Pederson, Science and Public
Policy: A Case Study of the Clean Air Act, Pace Univ. Law Rev. (forthcoming
1999).
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See Farber, supra note, for an illuminating discussion of this point.
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highly desirable phenomenon in environmental protection,279 and a
phenomenon to which cost-benefit analysis is, at least in practice,280
unlikely to contribute.
In the abstract, it is hard to know whether this argument is
valid.281 What is clear is that the statutory scheme, pragmatically
defensible as it may be, is far from transparent, and provides a set of
confusing signals to the American public.
IX. Conclusion
Whenever an agency issues a regulation designed to diminish
risks to health, safety, or the environment, it should attempt to
identify the gains sought by the particular regulation it has chosen,
and it should compare these gains to those under at least two
reasonable alternative regimes, one stricter and one more lenient. In
this light, the most serious problem with the EPA’s performance in
issuing national air quality standards is that it usually fails to explain,
in simple, concise terms, its decision to require a particular level of
ambient air quality. Sometimes the EPA acts as if it were pursuing
“safety” and ensuring “safe levels,” without sufficiently
acknowledging that for most pollutants, the serious question is what
degree of safety. To its credit, the EPA invariably offers extensive
discussions of the underlying data, demonstrating that there is a
genuine health risk at current levels. But to the extent that it
provides an explanation of its particular choices, the discussion often
279

Technology-forcing is not desirable if the costs of the forcing greatly exceed the
benefits—if, for example, the new technology contributes little to air quality, but
substantially increases prices and diminishes wages.
280
In principle, a competent cost-benefit analysis would include the costs of new
technological developments, and indeed this issue is discussed in the particulates
and ozone regulatory impact analysis. See RIA, supra, chapter 11. The problem is
that government is likely to have very little information about the cost of
technological innovation, and industry is likely to overstate those costs by a
significant amount. See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1993) (discussing
substantial overstatement of compliance costs).
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See the valuable recent article by James Krier, On The Topology of National
Standards in a Federal System—And Why It Matters, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1226
(1995), a staunch and long-time defender of cost-benefit analysis for the Clean Air
Act, who acknowledges the pragmatic possibility.
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involves little more than evidence of nontrivial adverse effects at
those current levels—evidence that may well argue for a reduction
from current levels, but does not by itself call for any particular
regulatory standard.
In this Article I have argued that EPA (and other agencies
involved in similar tasks) should offer a detailed “benefits analysis.”
The central goal of this approach would be to create a kind of federal
common law of environmental protection, generated in the first
instance by administrative agencies, and designed to promote
consistency and rationality in the protection of health and safety. I
have also defended a form of democracy-promoting minimalism for
administrative law—the particular form of minimalism that is
embodied in the remand, often (and increasingly) unaccompanied by
invalidation. The Clean Air Act should not be held unconstitutional,
and EPA should not be required, on pain of constitutional
invalidation, to come up with a “generic unit of harm” to encompass
population affected, severity, and probability. The new
nondelegation doctrine is a large mistake. On the other hand,
ordinary judicial review should require any national ambient air
quality standard to be accompanied by an adequate explanation of
why that level, rather than one more or less stringent, has been
selected. By itself, this requirement calls (to the extent feasible) for a
high degree of quantification from EPA; it also bears on the
performance of other regulatory agencies entrusted with the task of
promoting health, safety and the environment. It also calls for
invalidation, and not merely remand, where the agency is unable to
offer an explanation of its choice of one level of regulation rather
than another. A requirement of this kind would mark a key moment
in the shift from the rigidity and simplicity of 1970s
environmentalism toward a new and more promising approach—one
that places a high premium on assessing the magnitude of problems,
ensuring consistency across regulations, limiting interest-group
power, acquiring better information, and authorizing democratic
control of regulatory choices.
My principal claim here is that both courts and the EPA should
construe the Act so as to prevent regulation of small risks and so as
to require regulation of substantial risks—and the EPA should
explain, as quantitatively as possible, what must be shown in order
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for a risk to qualify, or not to qualify, as substantial. It is excessive, a
form of rhetoric, to say that on the EPA’s view, it is entitled to
choose any level between zero risk and a level slightly below
London’s “killer fog.” But it is not a form of rhetoric to think that if
the EPA has not limited its own discretion by speaking in less
conclusory terms, the Clean Air Act raises problems for both
regulatory policy and democratic self-government. The ultimate goal
of the forms of the democracy-promoting minimalism that I have
endorsed here would be to ensure better policy analysis and greater
transparency of decision, in a way that should simultaneously
promote democratic, economic, and air quality goals.
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1. Particulate Matter
PM 2.5
a. July 17, 1997 (62 FR 38652): EPA sets a public health standard
for fine particle pollution.
PM 10:
a. April 30, 1971 (36 FR 8186): EPA promulgates the primary and
secondary standards for particulate matter. 76 micrograms per cubic
meter—annual geometric mean (primary); 260 µg/m3 , 24 hour
average not to be exceeded more than once per year (primary);
150µg/m3 maximum 24-hour concentration not to be exceeded more
than once per year (secondary); 60 µg/m3 annual geometric mean
(secondary).
b. July 1, 1987 (52 FR 24854): EPA changes the indicator for PM
from total suspended particles to PM 10. 24-hour PM10 of 150
µg/m3 with no more than one expected exceedance per year; annual
P M 10 standard of 50 µg/m3 expected annual arithmetic mean;
secondary standards identical to primary standards.
c. July 18, 1997 (62 FR 38652): EPA promulgates regulation which
is later struck down by DC Circuit. Two new PM2.5 standards added,
set at 15 µg/m3 and 65 µg/m3.
2. Ozone:
a. April 30, 1971 (36 FR 8186): EPA promulgates first NAAQS for
photochemical oxidants. 160 µg/m3; 0.08ppm maximum 1-hour
concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year.
b. 1977 (42 FR 20493): EPA reviews and updates criteria document.
Primary standard revised and secondary standard set identical to
primary.
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c. February 8, 1979 (44 FR 8202): EPA revises primary standard to
.12ppm.
d. March 9, 1993 (58 FR 13008): EPA reviews air quality standards
and decides not to revise standards.
e. February 3, 1994 (50 FR 5164): EPA announces it will review
standards.
f. July 18, 1997 (62 FR 38856): EPA promulgates new standards
which are later struck down by the DC Circuit Court. 8-hour
standard at a level of 0.08 ppm (primary standard); identical
0.08ppm secondary standard.
(A more complete history of ozone is presented in section II.B. of
the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards Staff Paper,
Review of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for O3;
Assessment of Scientific and Technical Information (U.S. APA
1996b))
3. Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Dioxides):
a. April 30, 1971: EPA promulgates primary and secondary
NAAQS for sulfur oxides. 80 µg/m3, 0.03ppm annual arithmetic
mean (primary); 365 µg/m3 ; .14 ppm maximum 24-hour
concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year (primary);
1300 µg/m3; 0.5ppm maximum 3-hour concentration not to be
exceeded more than once per year (secondary); 60 µg/m3; 0.02 ppm
annual arithmetic mean; 260 µg/m3 ; 0.1 ppm maximum 24-hour
concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year.
b. April 26, 1988 (53 14926): EPA decides not to revise the existing
primary and secondary standards.
c. April 21, 1993 (58 FR 21351): EPA decides not to revise the
existing secondary standards.
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d. November 15, 1994 (59 FR 58958): EPA publishes a second
proposal regarding revision of primary standards for sulfur oxides. A
final decision that revision of the secondary standard was not
appropriate was published April 21, 1993 (58 FR 21351).
e. May 22, 1996 (61 FR 25566): EPA reviews and revises the air
quality criteria upon which the existing national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) for sulfur oxides are based. Based on that
review, EPA decides that revisions of the NAAQS for sulfur oxides
are not appropriate at this time, aside from several minor technical
changes.
4. Nitrogen Oxides:
a. April 20, 1971 (36 FR 8186): EPA issues identical primary and
secondary standards for NO2 set at 0.053 ppm (100 µg/m3) annual
arithmetic average
b. December 12, 1978 (43 FR 581117): EPA announces the first
review and update.
c. July 19, 1985 (50 FR 25532): EPA decides to retain the same
standard.
d. April 26, 1988 (53 FR 58598): EPA publishes a second proposal
regarding revision of primary standards
e. April 21, 1993 (58 FR 21351): EPA decides that revisions to the
secondary standard are not appropriate.
f. October 11, 1995 (60 FR 52875): EPA proposes to retain national
standards for nitrogen dioxide.
g. October 8, 1996 (61 FR 52852): EPA issues its final decision
retaining standard for nitrogen dioxide.
5. Carbon Monoxide:
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a. April 30, 1971 (36 FR 8186): EPA promulgates the initial
standard for carbon monoxide at the level of 10 µg/m3 , 9 ppm
maximum 8-hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once
per year; 40 µg/m3, 35 ppm maximum 1-hour concentration not to
be exceeded more than once per year.
b. September 13, 1985 (50 FR 37501): EPA retains the primary
standard and revokes the secondary standard.
c. August 1, 1994 (59 FR 38,906, 38909-11): EPA announces its
decision to retain the current primary standard for carbon monoxide.
There is no secondary standard for carbon monoxide.
6. Lead:
a. October 5, 1978 (43 FR 46246): EPA promulgates standards for
lead at the level of 1.5 µg/Pbm3.
b. November 5, 1997 (62 FR 59813): EPA publishes final rule for
lead, but withdraws it on Dec. 23, 1997 due to adverse comments
(62 FR 67009).
c. January 20, 1999 (64 FR 3021): EPA issues final rule.

Note: The following tables are taken from the EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis, as noted in the text.
Table 2
Proposed PM10 Standard (50/150 g/m3 ) 99th Percentile
National Annual Health Incidence Reductions282
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS: (year = 2010)
ENDPOINT283
Annual PM2.5 ( g/m3)
Daily PM2.5 ( g/m3)
*1. Mortality284: short-term exposure
long-term exposure
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. Congestive heart failure
*5. Ischemic heart disease

Partial Attainment Scenario
50
150
360
340
6,800
190
470
170
140
130
140

282

numbers may not completely agree due to rounding
only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates
284 mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long-term exposure but
not both due to double-counting issues
283
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ENDPOINT283
Annual PM2.5 ( g/m3)
Daily PM2.5 ( g/m3)
*6. Acute Bronchitis
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks
*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)
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Partial Attainment Scenario
50
150
1,100
10,400
5,300
18,300
8,800
106,000
879,000

Table 3
Ozone : National Annual Health Incidence Reduction285
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone NAAQS
(year = 2010)
ENDPOINT286
0.08 5th Max
High-end Est.
Ozone Health:
*1. Mortality
Hospital Admissions
*2. all respiratory (all ages)
all respiratory (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
emer. dept. visits for asthma
*3. Acute Respiratory Symptoms
(any of 19)
asthma attacks
MRADs
*4. Mortality from air toxics

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 4th Max
0.08 3rd Max
Low- to High-end Est.
High-end Est.

80

0 - 80

120

280
2,300
860
260
120
28,510

300 - 300
2,330 - 2,330
870 - 870
260 - 260
130 - 130
29,840 - 29,840

420
1,570
600
200
180
42,070

60
620
1

60 - 60
650 - 650
1-1

90
920
2

285 numbers may not completely agree due to rounding
286 only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates
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ENDPOINT286
0.08 5th Max
High-end Est.
Ancillary PM Health:
*1. Mortality287: short-term exp.
long-term exposure
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. congestive heart failure
*5. ischemic heart disease
*6. Acute Bronchitis
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks
*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 4th Max
0.08 3rd Max
Low- to High-end Est.
High-end Est.

60
180
400

0 - 80
0 - 250
0 - 530

110
340
690

70
50
20
10
10
10
290
3,510
320
800
4,210
38,700
322,460

0 - 90
0 - 60
0 - 20
0 - 20
0 - 20
0 - 20
0 - 400
0 - 4,670
0 - 430
0 - 1,220
0 - 5,510
0 - 50,440
0 - 420,300

120
80
30
20
20
20
530
6,190
570
1,660
7,200
66,160
551,300

287 PM mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long-term exposure but not both due to doublecounting issues
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Table 4
Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (Mean Values)
Health Endpoint

Mean WTP Value per Incident
(1990 $)

Mortality
Life saved
Life year extended
Hospital Admissions:
All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages
Pneumonia, age Æ 65
COPD, age Æ 65
Ischemic Heart Disease, age Æ 65
Congestive Heart Failure, age Æ 65
Emergency Visits for Asthma
Chronic Bronchitis
Upper Respiratory Symptoms
Lower Respiratory Symptoms
Acute Bronchitis
Acute Respiratory Symptoms (any of 19)

$4.8 million
$120,000
$12,700
$13,400
$15,900
$ 20,600
$ 16,600
$9,000
$260,000
$19
$12
$45
$18
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Health Endpoint
Asthma
Shortness of Breath
Sinusitis and Hay Fever
Work Loss Days
Restricted Activity Days (RAD)
Minor RAD
Respiratory RAD
Worker Productivity
Visibility: residential
Recreational
Household Soiling Damage

Mean WTP Value per Incident
(1990 $)
$32
$5.30
not monetized
$83
$38
not monetized
$1 per worker per 10% change in ozone
$14 per unit decrease in deciview per household
Range of $7.30 to $11 per unit decrease in deciview
per household (see U.S. EPA, 1997a)
$2.50 per household per g/m3

*See the Benefits TSD for citations (U.S. EPA, 1997a).
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Table 5
Proposed PM10 Standard (50/150 g/m3 ) 99th Percentile
National Annual Monetized Health Benefits Incidence Reductions288
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone (0.12 ppm, 1-hr.)
(billions of 1990 $;year = 2010)
ENDPOINT289
Annual PM2.5 ( g/m3)
Daily PM2.5 ( g/m3)
290
*1. Mortality : short-term exposure
long-term exposure
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. Congestive heart failure
*5. Ischemic heart disease
*6. Acute Bronchitis

Partial Attainment Scenario
High-end Est.
50
150
$1.7
$1.6
$1.8
$0.002
$0.006
$0.003
$0.002
$0.002
$0.003
$0

288 numbers may not completely agree due to rounding
289 only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates
290 mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long-term exposure but not both due to double-counting
issues
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ENDPOINT289
Annual PM2.5 ( g/m3)
Daily PM2.5 ( g/m3)
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks
*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS
using long term mortality
using short term mortality
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Partial Attainment Scenario
High-end Est.
50
150
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0.009
$0.034
$3.4
$3.5

Table 6
Ozone : National Annual Monetized Health Benefits Estimate291
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone NAAQS (0.12 ppm, 1-hour)
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)
ENDPOINT292
Ozone Health:
*1. Mortality
Hospital Admissions
*2. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
emer. dept. visits for asthma
*3. Acute Respiratory Symptoms
(any of 19)
asthma attacks
MRADs
*4. Mortality from air toxics
Ancillary PM Health:
*1. Mortality293: short-term exp.
long-term exposure

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 4th Max
0.08 3rd Max
0.08 5th Max
Low- to High-end Est.
High-end Est.
High-end Est.
$0.370

$0.000 - $0.380

$0.570

$0.004
$0.029
$0.014
$0.004
$0.001
$0.001

$0.004 - $0.004
$0.029 - $0.029
$0.014 - $0.014
$0.004 - $0.004
$0.001 - $0.001
$0.001 - $0.001

$0.006
$0
$0.010
$0.003
$0.002
$0.001

$0
$0
$0.003

$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0.006- $0.006

$0
$0
$0.011

$0.300
$0.870

$0 - $0.400
$0 - $1.210

$0.520
$1.640

291 numbers may not completely agree due to rounding
292 only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates
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ENDPOINT292
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. congestive heart failure
*5. ischemic heart disease
*6. Acute Bronchitis
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks
*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS
using short-term PM mortality
using long-term PM mortality

0.08 5th Max
High-end Est.
$0.110

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 4th Max
0.08 3rd Max
Low- to High-end Est.
High-end Est.
$0 - $0.140
$0.180

$0.001
$0.001
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0.003
$0.012

$0 - $0.001
$0 - $0.001
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0.004
$0 - $0.016

$0.001
$0.001
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0.005
$0.020

$0.790
$1.400

$0.056
$1.785

$1.300
$2.400

293 PM mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long-term exposure but not both due to doublecounting issues
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Table 7
PM: Summary of National Annual Monetized Health and Welfare Benefits294
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)
Category295
Annual PM2.5
( g/m3)
Daily PM2.5 ( g/m3)
Health Benefits
Welfare Benefits
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS

294

High-end Est.
16
65
$83
$7.5
$90

numbers may not completely agree due to rounding
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Partial Attainment Scenario
Low- to High-end Est.
15
65
$15 to $96
$4.3 to $8.1
$19 to $104

High-end Est.
15
50
$99
$9
$107

Table 8
PM: Selected PM10 Standard (50/150 g/m3—99th percentile) Summary of National Annual Monetized
Health and Welfare Benefitsa
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)
Partial Attainment Scenario
High-end Est.
50
150
$3.4 to $3.5
$1.6
$5.1 to $5.2

Category
Annual PM10 ( g/m3)
Daily PM10 ( g/m3)
Health Benefits
Welfare Benefits
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS
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Table 9
Ozone: Summary of National Annual Monetized
Health and Welfare Benefitsa
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)
Category
Health Benefits
Welfare Benefits
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS

0.08 5th max
High-end Est.
$1.4
$0.25
$1.6

101

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 4th max
Low- to High-end Est.
$0.06 to $1.76
$0.32 to $0.32
$0.4 to $2.1

0.08 3rd max
High-end Est.
$2.4
$0.5
$2.9

Table 10
Proposed PM10 Standard (50/150 g/m3 ) 99th Percentile
National Annual Health Incidence Reductions296
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS: (year = 2010)
ENDPOINT297
Annual PM2.5 ( g/m3)
Daily PM2.5 ( g/m3)
*1. Mortality298: short-term exposure
long-term exposure
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. Congestive heart failure
*5. Ischemic heart disease
*6. Acute Bronchitis
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks
*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)

Partial Attainment Scenario
50
150
360
340
6,800
190
470
170
140
130
140
1,100
10,400
5,300
18,300
8,800
106,000
879,000

102

Table 11
Comparison of Annual Benefits and Costs of PM Alternatives in 2010a,b (1990$)
PM2.5
Alternative
( g/m3)
16/65
(high end estimate)
15/65
(low end estimate)
(high end estimate)
15/50
(high end estimate)

Annual Benefits of
Partial Attainmentc
(billion $) (A)

Annual Costs of
Partial Attainment
(billion $) (B)

Net Benefits of
Partial Attainment
(billion $)
(A - B)

90

5.5

85

19

19 - 104

8.6

10 - 95

30

108

9.4

98

41

Number of
Residual
Nonattainment
Counties

a All estimates are measured incremental to partial attainment of the current PM10 standard (PM10 50/150, 1 expected
exceedance per year).
b The results for 16/65 and 15/50 are only for the high end assumptions range. The low end estimates were not calculated for
these alternatives.
c Partial attainment benefits based upon post-control air quality as defined in the control cost analysis.
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Table 12
Comparison of Annual Benefits and Costs of Ozone Alternatives in 2010a,b (1990$)
Ozone
Alternative
(ppm)
0.08 5th Max
(high end estimate)
0.08 4th Max
(low end estimate)
(high end estimate)
0.08 3rd Max
(high end estimate)

Annual Benefits of
Partial Attainment
(billion $) (A)

Annual Costs of
Partial Attainment
(billion $) (B)

Net Benefits of
Partial Attainment
(billion $)
(A - B)

1.6

0.9

0.7

12

0.4 - 2.1

1.1

(0.7) - 1.0

17

2.9

1.4

1.5

27

Number of
Residual
Nonattainment
Areas

a All estimates are measured incremental to partial attainment of the baseline current ozone standard (0.12ppm , 1 expected
exceedance per year).
b The results for .08, 5th and .08, 3rd max. are only for the high end assumptions. The low end estimates were not calculated
for these alternatives.
c Partial attainment benefits based upon post-control air quality estimates as defined in the control cost analysis.
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